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ABSTRACT 
The post-crisis financial services regulatory overhaul, and, 
particularly, the creation of the European System of Financial 
Supervision (ESFS) and the Banking Union mechanisms, has 
increased the complexity of the EU financial supervisory architecture. 
In this new system, financial supervision is carried out by a network 
of interconnected financial supervisors, with different mandates and 
subject to various accountability structures, operating at both the 
Member State and EU levels and bound by a regime of cooperation 
duties. An efficient cooperation among and within the various 
levels of this complex supervisory architecture is critical for the good 
functioning of the EU financial system. This Article identifies and 
analyzes key supervisory cooperation challenges in the single market 
for financial services, and assesses whether the EU legal and 
regulatory frameworks effectively address them. The Article argues 
that, despite the advancement of EU financial services integration 
and supervisory convergence that the post-crisis regulatory overhaul 
has brought, there are important legal and regulatory obstacles to an 
efficient supervisory cooperation in the European Union; these 
source, primarily, from the following: first, the lack of clarity and 
precision of the EU regime on supervisory cooperation duties; 
second, the limited applicability of the ESFS’s mediation mechanisms 
to supervisory cooperation disputes; and, third, the tensions between 
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transnational mandates of financial supervision and national 
accountability structures and mandates. The Article also examines the 
threats that Brexit and the EU political crisis pose to EU financial 
integration and supervisory cooperation. 
Keywords: financial supervision, supervisory cooperation, 
European System of Financial Supervision, Banking Union, Brexit 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the European Union, supervisory responsibilities concerning 
financial markets, institutions and the financial system are fragmented 
among a number of competent supervisory authorities (“CSAs”) at 
both the Member State and EU levels.1 Owing to the cross-border 
                                                                                                             
1. For an overview of the EU financial regulatory and supervisory architecture as well as 
its main actors see generally, House of Lords European Union Committee (UK), The Post-
Crisis EU Financial Regulatory Framework: Do the Pieces Fit?, 5th Report of Session 2014-
15, HL 103 (2015); FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: A POST-CRISIS ANALYSIS 
(Eddy Wymeersch et al. eds., 2012). There is no single definition of CSAs but, generally, this 
concept comprises “entities of a public nature with officially recognized authority to carry out 
regulation and supervision of the financial sector–financial institutions, markets, and products– 
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nature and implications of EU financial sector activities,2 when CSAs 
perform supervisory functions they often need to cooperate with and 
assist each other; for example, the home CSA of a financial entity 
may need information about the latter that can only be obtained 
through cooperation of a host CSA in a Member State where such 
entity is providing financial services.3 
An efficient financial supervisory cooperation framework is 
essential for the good functioning of the single market for financial 
services and, more generally, for fostering financial integration in the 
European Union.4 Without adequate supervisory cooperation, CSAs 
may be unable to properly exercise their supervisory and enforcement 
responsibilities, and to guarantee core targets of financial supervision, 
such as the soundness of the financial markets, the stability of the 
financial system and consumer protection.5 Also, suboptimal levels of 
cooperation between CSAs increase the risk of an inconsistent 
application of EU law across the Member States,6 and supervisory 
arbitrage.7 
Before the global financial crisis, the rules and procedures on 
supervisory cooperation in the European Union were, primarily, 
                                                                                                             
in a given jurisdiction.” PABLO IGLESIAS-RODRÍGUEZ, THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF FINANCIAL 
REGULATORS: A EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 5 (2014). 
2. Despite the negative effects of the global financial crisis on international financial 
flows, intra-EU capital flows are of major importance to the EU economy; for example, in the 
year 2015, intra-EU Foreign Direct Investment inflows amounted to EURO 365 billion. See 
Commission, Commission Staff Working Document on the Movement of Capital and the 
Freedom of Payments, SWD (2017) 94 final, at 14. 
3.  For examples of procedures applicable to supervisory cooperation requests in the 
European Union see, e.g., Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2017/980 of 7 June 
2017 laying down implementing technical standards with regard to standard forms, templates 
and procedures for cooperation in supervisory activities, for on-site verifications, and 
investigations and exchange of information between competent authorities in accordance with 
Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2017 O.J. L 148/3. 
4. See, e.g., Commission, Green Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005 - 2010), COM 
(2005) 177, at 10 [hereinafter Green Paper]; EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, FINANCIAL 
INTEGRATION IN EUROPE 39-43 (2007). 
5. See, e.g., Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design 
in Financial Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 243, 246 
(2010). 
6. See, e.g., Takis Tridimas, EU Financial Regulation: From Harmonization to the Birth 
of EU Federal Financial Law, in THE EUROPEAN UNION LEGAL ORDER AFTER LISBON 120 
(Patrick Birkinshaw & Mike Varney eds., 2010). 
7. Christopher P. Buttigieg, Governance of Securities Regulation and Supervision: Quo 
Vadis Europa?, 21 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 411, 425 (2015). 
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Member State-based, and their scope was very narrow, excluding, for 
instance, macro-prudential oversight. 8  Financial supervisory 
responsibilities were distributed among Member State CSAs with 
different structures, targets, mandates, and powers.9 The role of the 
European Union in the organization and coordination of supervisory 
cooperation was very limited.10 Although EU financial sector laws 
acknowledged certain supervisory cooperation duties,11 cooperation 
was essentially articulated on the basis of non-binding agreements, 
and CSAs from the Member States enjoyed ample margins of 
discretion in deciding whether or not to cooperate with each other in 
particular instances. 12  This resulted in inconsistent approaches to 
supervisory cooperation across the European Union.13 
The crisis exposed the failures of such a nationally-based system 
of financial supervision and supervisory cooperation.14 The financial 
services regulatory overhaul that followed, and, particularly, the 
creation of the European System of Financial Supervision (“ESFS”) 
                                                                                                             
8 . See, e.g., Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions: A Reformed Financial Sector for Europe, COM (2014) 279 final, at 4. 
9. See generally, Eddy Wymeersch, The Structure of Financial Supervision in Europe: 
About Single Financial Supervisors, Twin Peaks and Multiple Financial Supervisors, 8 EUR. 
BUS. ORG. L. REV  237 (2007). 
10 . For example, the Lamfalussy Committees–which are explained in Section IV.B 
below–played a role in the promotion of supervisory cooperation and convergence in the 
European Union; however, they had limited powers and authority. See Eilis Ferran, 
Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial Market Supervision, in 
Wymeersch, supra note 1, at 118. 
11. See, e.g., Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 
November 2003 on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or 
admitted to trading and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, recital 39, 2003 O.J. L 345/64; 
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on 
markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and 
Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directive 93/22/EEC, art. 56, 2004 O.J. L 145/1. 
12 . See, e.g., FRANKLIN ALLEN ET AL., CROSS-BORDER BANKING IN EUROPE: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY AND MACROECONOMIC POLICIES 5 (2011); 
Jianping Zhou, Institutional Setup for the Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union, 
in FROM FRAGMENTATION TO FINANCIAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE 46 (Charles Enoch et al. 
eds., 2014). 
13. See, e.g., Huw Jones, UK bank lobby urges better watchdog cooperation, REUTERS 
(Sept. 28, 2007), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-banks-regulator/mps-to-grill-uk-
watchdog-over-scrapping-of-banking-culture-review-idUKKBN0UL0YS20160107 [https://
perma.cc/22DQ-7V5P] (archived Mar. 5, 2018). 
14. THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN 
ON THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS 69, 75 (2001). 
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and the Banking Union mechanisms did introduce major changes to 
the EU financial supervision architecture, including in matters 
pertaining to supervisory cooperation.15 In this new architecture, there 
has been a transfer of supervisory responsibilities to the EU level; for 
instance, EU institutions–such as the European Central Bank 
(“ECB”)–and bodies–such as the European Supervisory Authorities 
(“ESAs”)–are entrusted with direct supervision of certain areas of the 
financial system,16 and they also play a key role in the development of 
rules on supervisory cooperation, 17  the creation of a common 
supervisory culture,18 and mediation between CSAs.19 
However, at the same time, the reforms of the EU financial 
supervisory system have significantly increased the complexity of the 
supervisory patchwork, which is composed of a network of 
interconnected CSAs with different mandates and subject to various 
accountability structures, operating at both the Member State and EU 
levels and bound by a system of cooperation duties. This raises the 
question of the role and limitations of EU law in dealing with such 
complexity and guaranteeing an efficient supervisory cooperation 
framework where CSAs are willing and able to cooperate with each 
other. This Article analyzes the supervisory cooperation challenges 
brought about by the complex and multi-level nature of the post-crisis 
EU financial supervision architecture, and assesses whether these 
challenges can be and are effectively addressed by the EU legal and 
regulatory frameworks. In order to do so, the remainder of this Article 
proceeds as follows. 
Part II offers a concept and taxonomy of supervisory cooperation 
that takes stock of the EU multi-level and transnational supervisory 
relationships; this is followed by an examination of the determinants 
of the incentives and ability of CSAs to cooperate in Part III. Part IV 
charts and assesses the evolution of the supervisory cooperation 
                                                                                                             
15. See infra, Part IV.  
16. For an analysis of the use and implications of such direct supervisory powers see, 
e.g., Elizabeth Howell, The Evolution of ESMA and Direct Supervision: are there Implications 
for EU Supervisory Governance?, 54 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1027 (2017). 
17. See, e.g., Niamh Moloney, Supervision in the Wake of the Financial Crisis, in 
Wymeersch, supra note 1, at 101-02. 
18. The ESAs play a key role in the promotion of supervisory convergence –for examples 
of actions in this area, see, e.g., EUROPEAN SECURITIES AND MARKETS AUTHORITY, 
SUPERVISORY CONVERGENCE: WORK PROGRAMME 2016 (2016). 
19. See infra, Part VI. 
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regime in the European Union, from the early days of the single 
market for financial services until the present; this Part explains the 
transformation of supervisory cooperation relationships resulting from 
the creation of the ESFS and the Banking Union. Part V examines the 
limits of and exceptions to supervisory cooperation duties embraced 
by the EU constitutional and legal frameworks and evaluates whether 
the process of EU financial integration and the increasing 
harmonization of financial rules have narrowed the discretion of 
CSAs from the Member States to withhold cooperation from other 
fellow CSAs. Part VI studies the main mechanisms offered by the 
post-crisis EU financial supervision architecture to address 
cooperation disputes between CSAs, their scope, applicability and 
potential impact on the incentives of CSAs to cooperate. Part VII 
considers the nature of the mandates of CSAs within the ESFS and 
the Banking Union and analyzes the potential tensions arising from 
the coexistence of transnational (EU-wide) and national (Member 
State) mandates of supervisory cooperation and of accountability 
relationships. Part VIII offers some insights with respect to the threats 
to EU financial integration and supervisory cooperation posed by 
Brexit and the prospect of a multi-speed EU. Part IX summarizes the 
main findings of this Article and concludes. 
II. THE CONCEPT OF SUPERVISORY COOPERATION AND ITS 
APPLICATION TO EU FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: A WORKING 
DEFINITION AND TAXONOMY 
Cooperation is a relationship in which one or more parties 
collaborate and/or assist each other in the performance of certain 
tasks. 20  In the field of financial supervision, cooperation refers, 
primarily, to the assistance provided among CSAs of the same or 
different jurisdictions, with respect to supervisory matters, namely 
licensing and authorization of financial entities, supervision stricto 
sensu, sanctioning, and crisis management.21 
                                                                                                             
20. The Cambridge Dictionary defines cooperation as: “the act of working together with 
someone or doing what they ask you”. Cooperation, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY (2d ed. 2007). 
21. Rosa Lastra, Financial Institutions and Accountability Mechanisms, in BUILDING 
RESPONSIVE AND RESPONSIBLE FINANCIAL REGULATORS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 34 (Iglesias-Rodríguez ed., 2015). CSAs perform both regulatory 
and supervisory roles and, although cooperation may refer to any of these functions, this 
Article focuses on the supervisory dimension of cooperation. 
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The existence of and need for supervisory cooperation stems 
from two main factors. First, supervisory responsibilities are 
fragmented among CSAs along inter alia functional,22 sectoral23 and 
jurisdictional dimensions.24 Second, the nature and implications of the 
activities of supervised financial entities often cut across one or more 
supervisory dimensions; as a result, those activities may be subject to 
oversight by various CSAs;25 it follows that, when CSAs carry out 
supervisory functions, they may often need to cooperate with each 
other. A supervisory cooperation procedure involves two key actors, 
namely a requesting CSA and a requested CSA.26 A requesting CSA 
will trigger a supervisory cooperation procedure when it needs 
cooperation by a requested CSA; this will normally relate to instances 
where, in order to exercise its supervisory functions, a requesting 
CSA must access information that can only be obtained through the 
                                                                                                             
22 . For instance, in jurisdictions that follow the twin-peaks model of financial 
supervision, also known as supervision by objectives, different CSAs are in charge of different 
objectives of financial supervision; this normally results in a CSA being responsible for 
prudential supervision and another CSA carrying out conduct of business supervision, of all 
sectors and entities in a given jurisdiction. See Wymeersch, supra note 9, at 258; GROUP OF 
THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION: APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A 
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 13-14 (2008). 
23. In the three-pillar/institutional model, the supervision –both prudential and conduct 
of business– of banking, insurance and securities entities is carried out by different CSAs. In 
this model, which is, for example, used in Spain, it is the activity and legal status of an entity 
that determines the CSA that will supervise it. See Wymeersch, supra note 9, at 250-51; and, 
Group of Thirty, supra note 22, at 24. 
24. An example of a multi-level jurisdictional financial supervision architecture is the 
ESFS in the European Union, where supervisory tasks are shared among EU bodies –e.g. the 
ESAs– and CSAs from the Member States. See generally, Eddy Wymeersch, The Institutional 
Reforms of the European Financial Supervisory System, an Interim Report (Ghent Univ. Fin. 
Law Inst. Working Paper No. 2010-01, 2010). 
25 . For example, ABN AMRO Bank N.V, a large Dutch banking institution, is 
supervised by two Dutch CSAs, i.e. the Dutch Central Bank (De Nederlandsche Bank) –the 
prudential supervisor–and the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (Autoriteit 
Financiële Markten)–the conduct of business supervisor–, as well as by one EU level CSA, 
namely the ECB. See Regulators, ABN AMRO (Jan. 13, 2018, 9:19 PM), 
https://www.abnamro.com/en/about-abnamro/our-company/corporate-
governance/regulators/index.html [https://perma.cc/K3PJ-4W5T] (archived Mar. 20, 2018). 
26. This is the terminology used by, inter alia, the European Securities and Markets 
Authority Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation Arrangements and 
Exchange of Information (ESMA/2014/608), art. 1 [hereinafter ESMA MMoU], and the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions Multilateral Memorandum of 
Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Information 
(2012), arts. 2-3 [hereinafter IOSCO MMoU]. 
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intervention of a requested CSA. 27  In this respect, a request may 
pursue, either the performance of actions by a requested CSA, aimed 
at acquiring and/or transmitting the relevant information, or the 
granting of an authorization to a requesting CSA to directly perform 
those actions–on its own, or jointly with the requested CSA; for 
example, a requesting CSA may make a request targeted at either 
gaining access to the offices of a financial entity in the jurisdiction of 
a requested CSA, with the purpose of conducting a joint on-site 
inspection with the requested CSA, or, alternatively, it may request 
that a requested CSA carries out such an inspection on its behalf.28 
Whereas supervisory cooperation often involves an ex-ante ad hoc 
request of assistance by a CSA, it may also be provided 
spontaneously by another CSA; supervisory cooperation agreements 
do, indeed, tend to embrace and encourage unsolicited assistance 
among CSAs.29 
National cooperation takes place between CSAs from the same 
jurisdiction; in the United Kingdom, two CSAs, namely the 
Prudential Regulation Authority (“PRA”)–in charge of authorization 
and prudential supervision of financial firms–and the Financial 
Conduct Authority (“FCA”)–entrusted with conduct of business 
supervision of financial firms– 30 have signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (“MoU”) that sets out mechanisms of cooperation, for 
example, through the exchange of information between both CSAs.31 
Likewise, CSAs engage in forms of multijurisdictional cooperation at 
the international level. International cooperation is particularly 
relevant in relation to the supervision of entities operating on a cross-
border basis–for example, incorporated in a Member State but with 
branches and/or subsidiaries in other Member States or outside the 
                                                                                                             
27. For instance, a requested CSA may hold records of transactions executed in its 
jurisdiction by a financial entity that is being investigated by the requesting CSA. 
28. See, e.g., ESMA MMoU, supra note 26, art. 6.  
29. For example, the IOSCO MMoU stipulates that: “Each Authority will make all 
reasonable efforts to provide, without prior request, the other Authorities with any information 
that it considers is likely to be of assistance to those other Authorities in securing compliance 
with Laws and Regulations applicable in their jurisdiction.” IOSCO MMoU, supra note 26, 
art. 13.   
30. For a critical analysis of the creation and rationale of the PRA and the FCA, see Eilis 
Ferran, The Break-up of the Financial Services Authority, 31 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 455 
(2011). 
31. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Financial Conduct Authority and the 
Bank of England, Including the Prudential Regulation Authority (Apr. 2013). 
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European Union.32 In the European Union, there is a coexistence of 
forms of national cooperation, i.e. between the CSAs of each Member 
State, or between EU level CSAs,33 and of supranational cooperation, 
i.e. between the EU CSAs and the Member State CSAs. 
Without adequate cooperation arrangements and procedures in 
place, CSAs may be unable to properly monitor and discipline firms 
under their supervisory remit; this may, in turn, result in costs being 
borne by investors and consumers of financial services.34 As regards 
systemic considerations, the global financial crisis evidenced that lack 
of or insufficient cooperation in prevention as well as resolution 
stages may also hinder the stability of the financial system. 35  An 
efficient supervisory cooperation framework is therefore essential for 
the accomplishment of key targets of financial supervision, such as 
the sound functioning of the financial markets, the protection of 
consumers of financial services and, ultimately, financial stability.36 
In the European Union, supervisory cooperation has been 
acknowledged as a condition of financial integration;37 consequently, 
as the process of construction of the EU single market for financial 
services advanced, policy-makers have been devoting greater degrees 
of attention to how to enhance cooperation between CSAs within the 
European Union.38 
                                                                                                             
32. Efficient supervisory cooperation has, indeed, been identified as a critical factor for 
the smooth operation of the EU single passport for financial services. See, e.g., Committee of 
European Securities Regulators, Protocol on the Supervision of Branches under MiFID 
(CESR/07-672b), at 2. 
33. Such as the ESAs. 
34 . The inadequate cooperation between the Financial Services Authority (FSA) –a 
former CSA in the UK–and the Bank of England with respect to Northern Rock –a banking 
institution–, contributed to the latter’s collapse. See, e.g., House of Commons Treasury 
Committee (UK), The Run on the Rock, 5th Report of Session 2007-08, HC 56-I (2008), at 
156-60; Dirk Schoenmaker, Financial Supervision in the EU, in HANDBOOK OF 
SAFEGUARDING GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND 
ECONOMIC THEORIES AND MODELS 363 (Gerard Caprio ed.,  2012). 
35 . An example was the insufficient cooperation between CSAs from Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands with respect to Fortis’ liquidity crisis in the year 2008. See, 
e.g., DIRK SCHOENMAKER, GOVERNANCE OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING: THE FINANCIAL 
TRILEMMA 79-81 (2013). 
36 . See, e.g., TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF 
SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, PRINCIPLES REGARDING CROSS-BORDER SUPERVISORY 
COOPERATION: FINAL REPORT 7-9 (2010)  
37. See, e.g., Green Paper, supra note 4, at 10. 
38. For example, the Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the 
EU (the de Larosiére Report), published in the year 2009 as a response to the global financial 
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Depending on the hierarchy of the CSAs involved in a given 
supervisory cooperation procedure, it is possible to define instances of 
horizontal or vertical cooperation. Horizontal cooperation refers to 
cooperation between CSAs from the same or different jurisdictions, 
operating at the same hierarchical level, or with different hierarchical 
standing, but with respect to matters in which they have equal 
authority or in relation to which supervisory authority is allocated 
symmetrically; an example of this type of cooperation would be that 
between a prudential CSA and a conduct of business CSA of the same 
jurisdiction in relation to the activities of a financial entity under the 
supervisory umbrella of both supervisors ; in the Netherlands , the 
Autoriteit Financiële Markten (“AFM”) and De Nederlandsche Bank 
(“DNB”)–respectively entrusted with conduct of business supervision 
and prudential supervision of both financial institutions and pension 
providers–articulate their cooperation through agreements that 
embrace, inter alia, the exchange of information and supervisory 
dialogues between both CSAs.39 Vertical cooperation involves CSAs 
from the same or different jurisdictions, operating at different 
hierarchical levels or with the same hierarchical standing but with 
respect to matters in which they have uneven authority; an example of 
such a vertical cooperation relationship would be a supranational 
CSA with exclusive competence on a given supervisory matter that 
requests information to a national CSA–bound by cooperation duties 
towards the supranational CSA–in relation to such matter; for 
instance, in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (“SSM”) of the 
Banking Union, the ECB is entrusted with the direct prudential 
supervision of significant credit institutions in the Member States that 
participate in the SSM,40 and the CSAs from those Member States are 
                                                                                                             
crisis, proposed several measures aimed at improving supervisory cooperation in the European 
Union; the de Larosiére Report will be further explained in Section IV.C below. THE HIGH-
LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE EU, REPORT (2009), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf [https://perma.cc
/J23R-MXBN] (archived Mar. 5, 2018) [hereinafter de Larosiére Report]. 
39. See, e.g., DNB, Covenant between Stichting Autoriteit Financiële Markten and De 
Nederlandsche Bank N.V., https://www.dnb.nl/binaries/Convenant%20AFM%20en%20DNB
%20%20Wta%20Wft%20Pw%20en%20Wvb_tcm46-156471.pdf [https://perma.cc/246X-
UCXK] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).  
40. Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the European 
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, 
art. 4.1, 2013 O.J.  L 287/63 [hereinafter SSM Regulation]. 
600 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:589 
bound by cooperation duties vis-à-vis the ECB in relation to the 
latter’s exercise of such a direct competence.41 
Cooperation may be requested and provided on the basis of 
informal or formal mechanisms. The former include forms of 
cooperation that do not abide by a particular set of pre-determined 
rules; an example is an informal conversation between the heads of 
two CSAs where they exchange views and/or information about a 
given financial entity or supervisory process.42 Formal mechanisms 
comprise instruments of cooperation that follow pre-determined ad 
hoc rules–binding or otherwise–applicable to a supervisory 
cooperation relationship. Among the formal mechanisms, there is a 
distinction between binding and non-binding mechanisms. Whereas 
supervisory cooperation has traditionally been and still is largely 
articulated through non-binding instruments, such as MoUs, 43 
financial regulatory frameworks tend to acknowledge cooperation 
duties that require CSAs to assist each other. 44 As will be shown 
throughout this Article, in the European Union, the post-crisis 
overhaul has strengthened the binding dimension of supervisory 
cooperation through, among others, the expansion of supervisory 
cooperation duties to which CSAs are subject. 
                                                                                                             
41 . SSM Regulation, supra note 40, art. 6.2. On the issue of competence sharing 
between the ECB and CSAs in the SSM, see Christos Gortsos, Competence Sharing Between 
the ECB and the National Competent Supervisory Authorities Within the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM), 16 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 401 (2015). 
42 . Informal mechanisms of supervisory cooperation, such as exchanges of letters 
between CSAs, played an important role in the early stages of development of the EU single 
market for financial services. See, e.g., Susanne Bergsträsser, Cooperation between 
Supervisors, in EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS: THE INVESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE 
AND BEYOND 380 (Guido Ferrarini ed.,1998). 
43. MoUs are written, non-binding, bilateral or multilateral agreements that set rules 
regarding exchange of information and cooperation between CSAs of the same or different 
jurisdictions; the IOSCO has developed various standards regarding the content of MoUs –see 
TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES 
COMMISSIONS, PRINCIPLES FOR MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING (1991).  
44. See, e.g., Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No. 716/2009/EC and repealing 
Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, art. 2.3, 2010 O.J. L 331/84. 
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III. THE DETERMINANTS OF SUPERVISORY COOPERATION: 
THE INCENTIVES AND ABILITY OF CSAS TO COOPERATE 
Despite the key instrumental role of supervisory cooperation for 
the good functioning of financial markets and in advancing financial 
integration, CSAs is the European Union have often failed to 
efficiently cooperate with each other. In the opinion of the High-
Level Group on Financial Supervision in the European Union, the 
pre-global financial crisis supervisory setting was characterized by a 
“Lack of frankness and cooperation between supervisors”45 that had 
detrimental effects on the quality and promptness of the responses to 
the financial meltdown: “As the crisis developed, in too many 
instances supervisors in Member States were not prepared to discuss 
with appropriate frankness and at an early stage the vulnerabilities of 
financial institutions which they supervised. Information flow among 
supervisors was far from being optimal, especially in the build-up 
phase of the crisis. This has led to an erosion of mutual confidence 
among supervisors.”46 
Suboptimal supervisory cooperation may adopt three main 
forms. The first is lack of cooperation; this may happen, for instance, 
when a CSA plainly rejects a request of cooperation. The second form 
of suboptimal cooperation consists of incomplete cooperation, an 
example being the provision of partial or insufficient information to a 
fellow CSA. Third, there are instances of delayed cooperation. 47 
Understanding the reasons why CSAs may engage in forms of 
suboptimal cooperation is essential to assess whether and how EU law 
adequately addresses this problem. Suboptimal levels of supervisory 
cooperation can be traced to two core general causes, namely lack of 
willingness and lack of ability of CSAs to cooperate. 
On the one side, a CSA–e.g. a requested CSA from a Member 
State– may lack willingness to cooperate, notably when the perceived 
costs of cooperating with another CSA–e.g. a requesting CSA from 
                                                                                                             
45. De Larosiére Report, supra note 38, at 41. 
46. Id. 
47. With regard to supervision of banking institutions, see Katia D’Hulster, Cross 
Border Banking Supervision Incentive Conflicts in Supervisory Information Sharing between 
Home and Host Supervisors, 12 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5871, 2011) 
(“At an institutional level, the home supervisor may not report, or may misreport or delay 
reporting supervisory information to the host supervisor, resulting in issues with regard to 
timeliness and relevance of information shared in a college.”). 
602 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:589 
another Member State– are higher than the benefits. The provision of 
supervisory cooperation may, in the first place, result in costs for 
supervised entities, financial markets and the financial system in the 
jurisdiction of the CSA providing cooperation; for example, the 
delivery of information about a supervised entity by a requested CSA 
–e.g. a host supervisor–may lead to sanctions being imposed on such 
entity by the requesting CSA–e.g. the home supervisor. In a 
supervisory cooperation relationship the incentives of CSAs may be 
misaligned, notably, when the economic and systemic relevance of a 
supervised entity is different in the jurisdictions of the requested CSA 
and of the requesting CSA, and, consequently, the actions resulting 
from the provision of cooperation, such as the imposition of sanctions 
to the supervised entity, have an asymmetrical impact in those 
jurisdictions; for instance, in the early stages of the global financial 
crisis, CSAs from various Member States adopted protectionist 
supervisory approaches characterized by lack of cooperation in crisis 
management, as well as ring-fencing practices aimed at prioritizing 
the interests of their own financial institutions. 48  Henceforth, the 
significance of a supervised entity in relation to which supervisory 
cooperation is sought, as well as the potential impact of the provision 
of such cooperation in the financial system under the supervisory 
remit of a requested CSA, are key factors that will determine the 
latter’s incentives to cooperate.49 In addition, supervisory cooperation 
is an intrinsically costly activity that requires the mobilization of time 
and other resources, whose cost will also be considered by a CSA 
when assessing the value of cooperation in a particular supervisory 
                                                                                                             
48. Nicolas Véron, Banking Nationalism and the European Crisis: Oral remarks 
prepared for a speech on the changing European financial system, given in Istanbul on 27 
June 2013 at a symposium of the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
(EVCA) (Oct. 19, 2013), http://bruegel.org/2013/10/banking-nationalism-and-the-european-
crisis/ [https://perma.cc/9VBC-J4TU] (archived Mar. 5, 2018); Dirk Schoenmaker, Banking 
supervision and Resolution: The European Dimension, 6 L. & FIN. MKT. REV. 52, 53 (2012). 
On the misalignment of incentives between home and host supervisors, see generally, 
Katharina Pistor, Host’s Dilemma: Rethinking EU Banking Regulation in Light of the Global 
Crisis (European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Finance Working Paper No. 286, 
2010), http://www.ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/SSRN-id1631940
.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR5G-N7W3] (archived Mar. 5, 2018).  
49. D’Hulster, supra note 47 (offering a detailed account of the impact of the economic 
and systemic significance of supervised banking entities on the incentives of home and host 
supervisors to cooperate). 
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context. 50  However, lack of cooperation may also have negative 
effects for a CSA withholding it. Notably, it may hinder supervisory 
relationships with the CSA requesting or expecting cooperation. This 
may, in turn, result in future costs for an uncooperative CSA–for 
example if a CSA that has been denied cooperation behaves 
reciprocally and refuses to provide cooperation in the future. 
Likewise, a non-cooperative CSA may be subject to various forms of 
accountability when, by not cooperating, it is deemed as having acted 
against its duties and mandates.51 
On the other side, a CSA may face scenarios where it may be 
willing to cooperate but is not able to do so. There may be two 
primary reasons for this. The first is the presence of resource 
constrains that hinder the ability of a CSA to meaningfully cooperate, 
if at all.52 The second relates to legal and regulatory constrains that 
may preclude a CSA from offering cooperation. Legal and regulatory 
constraints may fall within three main categories. First, rules 
regarding supervisory cooperation may be absent or incomplete; this 
would include cases in which the rules concerning the procedure for 
supervisory cooperation are too vague and do not offer a precise 
answer on how cooperation is to be organized in a particular 
supervisory setting. Second, the legal framework in which a CSA 
operates may embrace exceptions to the duty to cooperate that allow 
and/or require a CSA to withhold cooperation in certain instances.53 
Third, there may be cases in which there is a conflict between the 
mandate of a CSA and compliance of the latter with a given request 
of cooperation.54 
The EU regime of supervisory cooperation in the financial field 
has experienced major transformations throughout the various stages 
of development of the EU single market for financial services. The 
successive reforms of such a regime have aimed at, inter alia, 
fostering the incentives and ability of CSAs to cooperate as well as 
financial integration. The next Part examines the evolution of the EU 
                                                                                                             
50. See, e.g., Richard J. Herring, Conflicts between Home & Host Country Prudential 
Supervisors, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTABILITY: GLOBAL BANKING AND NATIONAL 
REGULATION 212 (Douglas D. Evanoff et al. eds., 2007). 
51. But see D’Hulster, supra note 47, at 6 (noting that the accountability of CSAs for 
lack of cooperation with foreign counterparts is very limited). 
52. See, e.g., Herring, supra note 50, at 212. 
53. See infra, Part V. 
54. See infra, Part VII.  
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regime on supervisory cooperation from the early days to the present; 
it also addresses the reforms encompassed by the European System of 
Financial Supervision and the Banking Union, which have radically 
transformed the supervisory cooperation architecture in the European 
Union.  
IV. EU FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY COOPERATION IN 
PERSPECTIVE: FROM THE EARLY BEGINNINGS TO THE POST-
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS REGULATORY OVERHAUL 
The evolution of the system of financial supervisory cooperation 
in the European Union is linked to developments in EU financial 
regulation as well as in the institutional architecture of EU financial 
services supervision. This Part distinguishes three main periods of 
development of the EU regime of financial supervisory cooperation, 
and analyzes the nature and instruments of supervisory cooperation in 
each of them. It also assesses whether and the extent to which 
different forms of cooperation address the challenges relating to the 
ability and willingness of CSAs from different Member States to 
assist each other. 
A. EU Financial Supervisory Cooperation in the Early Days 
In the initial stages of construction of the EU single market for 
financial services, which can be traced to the Treaty of Rome and 
which received additional momentum in the year 1986 with the 
adoption of the Single European Act, 55  cooperation was primarily 
horizontal. This was, to a great extent, due to the decentralized nature 
of the EU financial regulatory and supervisory architecture, which 
was largely built through directives and based on the principles of 
                                                                                                             
55. The Treaty of Rome embraced the notions of free movement of capital and services 
as well as freedom of establishment; the Single European Act instituted a series of changes 
aimed at, among others, completing the internal market. For an overview of the process of 
creation of an internal market for financial services, see Sydney J. Key, Financial Integration 
in the European Community, 5, 11-12 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
International Finance Discussion Paper No. 349, 1989); see also Caroline Bradley, 1992: The 
Case of Financial Services, 12 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 124, 141 (1991); Manning Gilbert 
Warren III, The European Union’s Investment Services Directive, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 181, 
182 (1994). 
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minimum harmonization 56  and mutual recognition as well as a 
combination of home country control and host country supervision.57 
In such framework, there was an exclusive delegation of regulatory 
and supervisory functions in the financial services field to CSAs of 
the Member States, with no EU level independent authorities 
performing or even coordinating those functions. 
Second, cooperation was essentially two-sided and based on 
separate bilateral agreements subscribed between CSAs of the 
different Member States. This system somehow filled the lack of EU 
level ad hoc formal instruments embracing and providing a common 
multilateral framework for assistance among CSAs. As a 
consequence, the system of cooperation was fragmented and 
asymmetrical, largely dependent on the specific–non-harmonized– 
content of bilateral agreements.58 
Third, cooperation was rather informal. This does not mean that 
it was voluntary. On the contrary, EU laws in the financial realm 
have, long since, recognized the binding character of cooperation 
among CSAs.59 However, those very same laws provided neither an 
institutional framework nor precise substantive and procedural rules 
on whose basis a system of mutual assistance among CSAs could be 
built. EU Member States opted for implementing a system of 
cooperation based on instruments that gave them substantial 
                                                                                                             
56 . Under the minimum harmonization approach, EU financial laws provided core 
common standards, giving, at the same time, room for some regulatory competition among the 
EU Member States. See EILIS FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET 54 (2004). 
57. See Commission, Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the 
Commission to the European Council, COM (85) 310 final, at 27-28 (June 1985); TOBIAS C. 
HOSCHKA, CROSS-BORDER ENTRY IN EUROPEAN RETAIL FINANCIAL SERVICES 42-43 (1993). 
Under this system, firms were authorized and subject to prudential regulation and supervision 
by CSAs in their home Member State, and entitled to offer services in other (host) Member 
States, which carried out ancillary regulation and supervision. See E. Waide Warner, “Mutual 
Recognition” and Crossborder Financial Services in the European Community, 55 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 8 (1992). 
58. See id. For examples of these types of agreements see, for instance, the list of 
bilateral cooperation agreements between the Spanish securities supervisor (the Comisión 
Nacional del Mercado de Valores (“CNMV”)) and other Member State CSAs, see (MOUs) 
International Agreements, https://www.cnmv.es/portal/legislacion/MOUS.aspx [https://
perma.cc/Y5PT-9XF2] (last visited Mar. 5, 2018). 
59. See, e.g., Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating 
regulations on insider dealing, art. 10, 1989 O.J. L 334/30 (stipulating that: “the competent 
authorities in the Member States shall cooperate with each other whenever necessary for the 
purpose of carrying out their duties…”). 
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flexibility and discretion; two of such instruments were particularly 
salient: informal exchanges and Memoranda of Understanding 
(“MoUs”). 
Informal exchanges of information constitute the most basic and 
earliest form of cooperation among CSAs, and their use preceded the 
first directives in the field of financial services. 60 In addition, this 
mechanism was pre-eminent and, to a large degree, exclusive, before 
cooperation was institutionalized through ad hoc formal instruments. 
In practice, informal exchanges take place through meetings and 
conversations among heads or senior staff of CSAs. They may also 
adopt the form of goodwill sharing of documents. Informal exchanges 
are not bound by given procedural rules specifying whether and how 
information is to be disclosed and exchanged.61 
MoUs are formal but non-binding agreements aimed at 
providing a general framework for cooperation between the signatory 
CSAs. MoUs address aspects such as the scope of assistance and the 
procedures applicable to a request of cooperation, as well as the 
modes in which such cooperation is to be provided by the requested 
CSA or the uses that the requesting CSA can make of the information 
received. MoUs were the first instruments to set up common 
substantive and procedural norms of supervisory cooperation. In the 
early stages of the EU internal market for financial services MoUs 
were bilateral. 
In this period, financial firms and actors tended to operate, 
primarily, on a national basis and their cross-border activities were 
rather limited. This was, in part, due to the presence of barriers for 
cross-border financial activities and capital flows. 62  Whereas the 
Single European Act and the resulting legislative measures in the 
financial sector, such as the Capital Liberalization Directive, 63  the 
                                                                                                             
60. References to this early form of cooperation are provided by Jean-Luc Lépine, A 
Response to Fedders “Waiver by Conduct”, 6 J. COMP. BUS. & CAP. MKT. L. 319 (1984). 
61. They are, however, subject to compliance with the legal and regulatory frameworks 
in the jurisdictions of the CSAs involved. 
62. See Jean Dermine, European Banking Integration, Ten Years After, 6-7 (Insead 
Working Paper No. 95/92/FIN, 1995). 
63. Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the implementation of Article 67 
of the Treaty, 1988 O.J. L 178/5. 
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Second Banking Directive64 or the Investment Services Directive,65 
all helped to remove some of the obstacles to cross-border financial 
activities–notably, the introduction of a system of single passports 
enabled financial market actors to move across jurisdictions more 
easily–,66 several barriers to cross-border capital flows persisted in the 
European Union.67 These barriers were detrimental to the creation of 
a strong cooperation culture among CSAs. In addition, the very nature 
of the main instruments of cooperation also posed some barriers to 
effective cooperation; in this respect, both MoUs and informal 
exchanges of information were not binding and, hence, they did not 
impose formal obligations on CSAs. Moreover, as will be explained 
in Part V, relevant EU legislation and MoUs executed between CSAs, 
incorporated a series of waivers from the duty to cooperate that 
allowed CSAs to withhold cooperation under certain conditions. 
Lastly, the lack of common substantive and procedural EU rules 
addressing cooperation arrangements led to a very fragmented 
system68 with high degrees of uncertainty as regards the rights and 
duties of CSAs in cooperation relationships. 
B. The Lamfalussy Architecture: Towards the Europeanization of 
Financial Supervisory Cooperation 
In the late 1990s CSAs of the Member States adopted various 
institutional initiatives that led to a strengthening of the framework of 
supervisory cooperation in the European Union. A major 
development in this respect was the creation of the Forum of 
European Securities Commissions (“FESCO”) by securities 
                                                                                                             
64. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989 on the coordination of 
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and pursuit of the 
business of credit institutions and amending Directive 77/780/EEC, 1989 O.J. L 386/1. 
65. Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the 
securities field, 1993 O.J.  L 141/27. 
66. The single passport essentially meant that a financial entity authorized to operate in a 
Member State was allowed to offer its services in other Member States without being subject 
to additional authorization requirements in the latter. See Innes Fraser & Paul Monimer-Lee, 
The EC Single Market in Financial Services, 3 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 92 (1993). 
67. See Emiliano Grossman & Patrick Leblond, Financial Regulation in Europe: From 
the Battle of the Systems to a Jacobinist EU, in CONSTRUCTING A POLICY-MAKING STATE?: 
POLICY DYNAMICS IN THE EU 197 (Jeremy Richardson ed., 2012). 
68. Commission, Communication on Financial Services: Implementing the framework 
for financial markets: Action Plan, COM (1999) 232, at 13-14 [hereinafter Financial Services 
Action Plan (“FSAP”)]. 
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supervisors of the Member States, Norway and Iceland in 1997.69 
Unlike insurance and banking supervisors, which had, long since, had 
their own EU supervisory cooperation fora, namely, the Conference 
of Supervisory Authorities of the Member States of the European 
Union and the Groupe de Contact, respectively, 70 this was not the 
case in the securities field. FESCO filled this important gap by 
offering a space of debate and exchange of ideas among CSAs in 
charge of securities supervision.71 Another critical development was 
the creation and adoption of the first formal, albeit non-binding, 
multilateral instruments of supervisory cooperation within the 
European Union. Notably, in the year 1997, the Conference of 
Supervisory Authorities published the “Siena Protocol” 72 and, two 
years later, FESCO adopted the Multilateral Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Exchange of Information and Surveillance of 
Securities Activities (“FESCO MoU”).73 These instruments provided, 
for the first time, common rules applicable to supervisory exchanges 
in the European Union; in doing so, they contributed, substantially, to 
the process of convergence in areas pertaining to supervisory 
cooperation.74 
                                                                                                             
69. See Susanne Bergsträsser, Regulatory Implications of an Exchange Merger, in 
CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE AGE OF THE EURO: CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS, LISTED 
COMPANIES AND REGULATION 294 (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds., 2002). 
70. The Conference of Insurance Supervisors was originally set up in the year 1958; it 
was composed of insurance CSAs from 15 EU Member States and three European Economic 
Area (“EEA”) countries. The Groupe de Contact was established in the year 1972 by banking 
CSAs from EEA countries. See Karel Lannoo, Supervising the European Financial System, 17, 
19 (Centre for European Policy Studies Policy Brief No. 21, 2002). 
71. Id. at 9. 
72. Protocol relating to the collaboration of the supervisory authorities of the Member 
States of the European Community in particular in the application of the Directives on life 
assurance and non-life insurance (DT/F/182/97). The Siena Protocol is a multilateral 
agreement of cooperation which addresses, inter alia, the responsibilities of home and host 
CSAs in supervisory processes. See Nina Moss, The International Network of Financial 
Authorities, in HANDBOOK OF CENTRAL BANKING AND FINANCIAL AUTHORITIES IN EUROPE: 
NEW ARCHITECTURES IN THE SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 388 (Donato 
Masciandaro ed., 2005). 
73. The FESCO MoU was adopted on January 26, 1999 and its aim was: “to establish a 
general framework for cooperation and consultation between the Authorities referred to 
hereinafter, in order to facilitate the fulfilling of their supervisory responsibilities.”  
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on the Exchange of Information and Surveillance 
of Securities Activities (Jan. 26, 1999), art. 1 [hereinafter FESCO MoU]. 
74.  See Ferran, supra note 56, at 47. 
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The Member State-nature of the first EU-wide supervisory 
cooperation arrangements was, to a great extent, the result of the 
reluctance of the Commission to develop EU level supervisory 
structures and mechanisms. For instance, in its Communication: 
Financial Services: Building a framework for action, while 
highlighting the importance of encouraging a closer coordination 
between CSAs 75  the Commission argued that: “structured co-
operation between national supervisory bodies–rather than the 
creation of new EU level arrangements–can be sufficient to ensure 
financial stability”.76 Whereas the Commission’s Financial Services 
Action Plan (“FSAP”), published in the year 1999,77 acknowledged 
the feasibility of future proposals for an EU single securities 
supervisor, 78  it nevertheless advocated for the development of 
supervisory arrangements based on the existing multilateral Member 
State-driven structures,79 rather than the creation of EU level ones. 
The idea of institutionalizing supervisory cooperation arrangements 
within ad hoc EU level structures was first proposed by the Final 
Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European 
Securities Markets (“Lamfalussy Report”), published in the year 
2001.80 In this respect, the Lamfalussy Report proposed the creation 
of an EU Securities Regulators Committee (“ESRC”), which would 
take over the functions of FESCO but with an official EU status–as an 
advisory body to the Commission–and a broader mandate. 81  This 
recommendation materialized in the creation of the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators (“CESR”) by the Commission in the 
                                                                                                             
75 . Commission, Communication on Financial Services: Building a framework for 
action, COM (1998) 625 final, at 5. 
76.  Id. at 2. 
77.  See FSAP, supra note 68. 
78.  Id. at 14. 
79 . Such as the Groupe de Contact, the Conference of Insurance Supervisors and 
FESCO. Id. 
80. THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN, FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN 
ON THE REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS (Feb. 15, 2001) [hereinafter 
Lamfalussy Report]. Such a report was preceded by an initial report by the same group. See 
THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN, INITIAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF WISE MEN ON THE 
REGULATION OF EUROPEAN SECURITIES MARKETS (Nov. 9, 2000) [hereinafter Initial 
Lamfalussy Report]. The Lamfalussy Group operated under a mandate from the ECOFIN. See 
id. at 1, 70.  
81. Lamfalussy Report, supra note 80, at 33-38. 
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year 2001. 82  This was followed by the establishment of its 
counterparts in the banking and insurance fields, namely the 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (“CEBS”) and the 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Supervisors (“CEIOPS”), respectively, in the year 2003. 83  The 
mandate of the Lamfalussy Committees was twofold. First, they were 
entrusted with the promotion of regulatory and supervisory 
consistency and convergence in the field of financial services in the 
European Union; 84  their tasks in this area included advising the 
Commission on policy issues as well as implementing measures, 
issuing non-binding guidelines, standards and recommendations 
targeted at furthering the uniform implementation and consistent 
application of EU financial laws by the Member States, and 
developing mechanisms aimed at fostering a consistent supervision 
and enforcement across the European Union.85 Another core function 
of the Lamfalussy Committees was to enhance supervisory 
cooperation among CSAs;86 their work in this field was extensive and 
included the development of guidelines on supervisory cooperation,87 
the creation of multilateral instruments of cooperation, such as 
                                                                                                             
82. Commission Decision 2001/527/EC of 6 June 2001 establishing the Committee of 
European Securities Regulators, 2001 O.J. L 191/45. 
83. Commission Decision 2004/5/EC of 5 November 2003 establishing the Committee 
of European Banking Supervisors, 2004 O.J. L 3/28; Commission Decision 2004/6/EC of 5 
November 2003 establishing the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Supervisors, 2004 O.J. L 3/30. The CESR, CEBS and CEIOPS will be collectively referred to 
as “Lamfalussy Committees”. 
84 . See, e.g., CESR, Charter of the Committee of European Securities Regulators 
(CESR/08-375d), art. 4 [hereinafter Charter of the CESR]; Commission Decision 2004/5/EC, 
supra note 83, art. 2. 
85. Commission Decision 2001/527/EC, supra note 82, art. 2; Commission Decision 
2004/5/EC, supra note 83, art. 2; Commission Decision 2004/6/EC, supra note 83, art. 2; 
Charter of the CESR, supra note 84, art. 4; CEBS, Charter of the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors, art. 4 [hereinafter Charter of the CEBS]; and CEIOPS, Charter of the 
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors, art. 4 [hereinafter 
Charter of the CEIOPS]. 
86 . See, e.g, Commission Decision 2004/5/EC, supra note 83, art. 2; Commission 
Decision 2004/6/EC, supra note 83; Charter of the CESR, supra note 84, art. 4.4; Charter of 
the CEBS, supra note 85. 
87. See, e.g., CEBS, Guidelines for Co-operation Between Consolidating 
Supervisors and Host Supervisors (2006), https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/
16094/GL09.pdf [https://perma.cc/WDJ9-BCGN] (archived Mar. 8, 2018). 
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MoUs, 88  as well as the operation of mechanisms of mediation 
between CSAs; 89  the latter gave the Lamfalussy Committees an 
important, albeit non-binding, 90  mediation role in the solution of 
supervisory cooperation disputes between CSAs. The Lamfalussy 
Committees also took a close interest in and encouraged the work of 
colleges of supervisors91–which CSAs had been establishing since the 
early 2000s–, 92  for example by developing common principles 
applicable to supervision within supervisory colleges, including in 
matters pertaining to supervisory cooperation.93 
Whereas the supervisory architecture embraced by the 
Lamfalussy Committees did not entail a transfer of powers from the 
Member State level to the EU level, 94  it did however result in a 
greater centralization of (quasi) supervisory functions in the latter. 
Particularly, the Commission’s recast of the decisions setting the 
CESR, the CEBS and the CEIOPS in the year 2009, broadened their 
remit so as to “strengthen their contributions to supervisory 
cooperation and convergence”. 95  Cooperation largely remained, 
                                                                                                             
88. See, e.g., CESR, Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on the Exchange of 
Information and Surveillance of Securities Activities (CESR/05-335) [hereinafter CESR 
MoU]. 
89 . See, e.g., CEIOPS, Protocol on Mediation Mechanism between Insurance and 
Pensions Supervisors (2007). 
90 . See, e.g., CEBS, Protocol of the CEBS Mediation Mechanism (2007), art. 5 
(“Mediation outcomes shall not have any legal effect, be legally binding or be enforceable.”), 
https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/16094/ProtocolonMediation20070925.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V9HD-DMN2] (last visited Mar. 8, 2018). 
91. These are collegiate structures carrying out supervision of specific market actors –
such as banks–that operate on a cross-border basis; supervisory colleges are made of CSAs 
from the jurisdictions responsible for and participating in the supervision of those cross-border 
entities. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE 
SUPERVISORY COLLEGES 1 (2014), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs287.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5BMQ-5ANR] (archived Mar. 8, 2018).  
92 . See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding on the Coordination, Supervision and 
Oversight of the Euronext Group (Mar. 2001) (Signing parties included the Authority for the 
Financial Markets (the Netherlands), the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (France), the 
Banking Finance and Insurance Commission (Belgium), and the Comissão do Mercado de 
Valores Mobiliarios (Portugal)). 
93. See, e.g., CEBS and CEIOPS, Colleges of Supervisors – 10 Common Principles 
(CEIOPS-SEC-54/08), (CEBS 2008 124), IWCFC 08 32 (2009). 
94. Rosa Lastra, The Governance Structure for Financial Regulation and Supervision in 
Europe, 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 49, 59 (2003). 
95 . See Commission Decision 2009/77/EC of 23 January 2009 establishing the 
Committee of European Securities Regulators, recital 6, 2009 O.J. L 25/18; Commission 
Decision 2009/78/EC of 23 January 2009 establishing the Committee of European Banking 
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nonetheless, a Member State matter, but with the European Union 
taking a much more active and formal role in the coordination of 
assistance among CSAs. 
The FSAP proposed a series of legislative measures that–jointly 
with the introduction of the Euro–boosted the process of financial 
integration and cross-border flows in the European Union,96 creating 
deeper interconnectedness between the financial systems of the 
Member States and increasing the need for supervisory cooperation 
among CSAs. 97  Despite this, such cooperation faced important 
barriers. The financial supervisory patchwork in the European Union 
was highly fragmented among CSAs with very different mandates, 
objectives and powers.98 In addition, as referred above, the EU level 
supervisory arrangements encompassed by the Lamfalussy 
architecture were limited in scope and non-binding. 
C. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Transformation of the 
EU Financial Supervisory Cooperation Architecture 
The global financial crisis exposed important flaws of the pre-
crisis financial architecture in the European Union, and the limitations 
of a nationally-based supervisory system; these were acknowledged 
by the Commission in its Communication on European Financial 
Supervision published in the early stages of the financial crisis: 
“Current supervisory arrangements proved incapable of preventing, 
managing and resolving the crisis. Nationally based supervisory 
models have lagged behind the integrated and interconnected reality 
of today’s European financial markets, in which many financial firms 
operate across borders. The crisis exposed serious failings in the 
cooperation, coordination, consistency and trust between national 
supervisors.”99 The roots of the reform leading to the post-crisis EU 
                                                                                                             
Supervisors, recital 6, 2009 O.J. L 25/23; Commission Decision 2009/79/EC of 23 January 
2009 establishing the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Supervisors, recital 6, 2009 O.J. L 25/28. 
96. Elias Papaioannou, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan & Jose-Luis Peydró, What is it good for? 
Absolutely for financial integration, VOX (June 20, 2009), http://voxeu.org/article/euro-s-
financial-integration-europe [https://perma.cc/YMQ3-DYQR] (archived Mar. 8, 2018).  
97 . CESR, Which Supervisory Tools for the EU Securities Markets? Preliminary 
Progress Report (04-333f),  at 8 [hereinafter Himalaya Report]. 
98. Lamfalussy Report, supra note 80, at 15-16; Himalaya Report, supra note 97, at 18. 
99. Commission, Communication from the Commission: European Financial 
Supervision, COM (2009) 252 final, at 2. 
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financial supervision architecture can be traced to the Report of the 
High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (“de Larosiére 
Report”), published in the year 2009.100 The High-Level Group was 
set up in the year 2008 by the Commission, which entrusted it with 
the formulation of recommendations about supervisory arrangements 
aimed at increasing the efficiency, integration and sustainability of 
financial supervision in the European Union. 101 According to the de 
Larosiére Report, the weaknesses of the EU pre-crisis system of 
financial supervision102 sourced from, inter alia, the lack of an EU 
macro-prudential supervisor, 103  the flaws and inefficiencies of the 
cooperation arrangements between CSAs at the Member State 
level, 104  as well as the limited resources and powers of the 
Lamfalussy Committees.105 The de Larosiére High-Level Group made 
proposals for the creation of a decentralized, but integrated and 
coordinated structure of financial supervision that would comprise 
new EU level macro and micro-prudential financial supervisors as 
well as the CSAs of the Member States. 106  These proposals were 
supported by the Commission, the Parliament and the Council and 
resulted in the creation of a European System of Financial 
Supervision (“ESFS”) in the year 2010.107 The ESFS is a network 
made of three pillars, each with its own institutional structures of 
financial regulation and supervision that operate in a coordinated 
manner, in charge of supervising the EU financial system.108 
The first pillar relates to EU-wide systemic risk supervision.109 
This is carried out by a European Systemic Risk Board (“ESRB”),110 
which performs macro-prudential oversight of the EU financial 
system, with the primary aim of preventing and mitigating systemic 
                                                                                                             
100. See de Larosiére Report, supra note 38. 
101. Commission Press Release, IP/08/1679 (Nov. 11, 2008). 
102. De Larosiére Report, supra note 38, at 38-58. 
103. Id. at 39-40. 
104. Id. at 40-41. 
105. Id. at 41-42. 
106. Id. at  4, 46-48. 
107. Council of the European Union Press Release, 16369/10, 18-19 (Nov. 17, 2010). 
108. See Regulation (EU) No. 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 24 November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system 
and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board, recital 14, art. 1.2, 2010 O.J. L 331/1 
[hereinafter ESRB Regulation]. 
109. Commission, COM (2009) 252 final, supra note 99, at 3. 
110. See ESRB Regulation, supra note 108. 
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risk, 111  issuing, where necessary, warnings and recommendations 
addressed to the European Union, its Member States, the European 
Supervisory Authorities (“ESAs”), or CSAs.112 
The second pillar concerns micro-prudential regulation and 
supervision at the EU level.113 This task is performed by three EU 
agencies, namely the European Supervisory Authorities (“ESAs”).114 
The ESAs are organized along sectoral lines and comprise the 
European Banking Authority (“EBA”),115 the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (“EIOPA”), 116  and the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (“ESMA”).117 The ESAs carry out 
important quasi-regulatory and supervisory functions. 118  On the 
rulemaking front, the ESAs develop guidelines and recommendations 
addressed to CSAs or financial market participants and targeted at, 
inter alia, promoting regulatory and supervisory convergence within 
the ESFS;119 they also contribute to building a single rulebook for the 
EU financial markets through the creation of draft regulatory and 
implementing standards 120  that develop technical aspects of EU 
                                                                                                             
111. ESRB Regulation, supra note 108, art. 3.1. 
112. Id. art. 16.2.  
113. Commission, COM (2009) 252 final, supra note 99, at 3. 
114. See Iglesias-Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 193-96. The ESAs were instituted by three 
Regulations –see infra notes 115, 116 and 117– which will be collectively referred to as 
“ESAs Regulations”. 
115. The EBA was instituted by Regulation. See Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European 
Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No. 716/2009/EC 
and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC, 2010 O.J. L 331/12 [hereinafter EBA 
Regulation], 
116. The EIOPA was instituted by Regulation. See Regulation (EU) No. 1094/2010 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European 
Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), amending 
Decision No. 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/79/EC, 2010 O.J. L 
331/48 [hereinafter EIOPA Regulation]. 
117. The ESMA was instituted by Regulation. See Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European 
Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No. 
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, 2010 O.J. L 331/84 
[hereinafter ESMA Regulation].  
118. Eddy Wymeersch, The European Financial Supervisory Authorities or ESAs, in 
Wymeersch et al., supra note 1. 
119. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art 16.1. 
120. Whereas the ESAs are entrusted with the drafting of technical standards, these are 
submitted to the Commission for consideration and approval through Regulations or 
Decisions. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, arts. 10.1, 10.4, 15.1, 15.4; Consolidated 
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financial sector laws.121 On the supervisory side, the ESAs monitor 
and assess market developments as well as their potential impact on 
financial market participants, providing, where necessary, 
recommendations aimed at preventing or remedying risks and 
vulnerabilities.122 They are also entrusted with the development of a 
common supervisory culture in the European Union through actions 
that range from participating in the creation of uniform supervisory 
standards to promoting cooperation between CSAs.123 An important 
difference between the Lamfalussy Committees and the ESAs is that, 
unlike the former, the latter do have binding supervisory and 
enforcement powers. For example, in cases of disagreements between 
CSAs, the ESAs may settle the dispute through a binding decision 
requiring the CSAs concerned to adopt or refrain from certain 
actions. 124  Moreover, the ESAs may adopt temporary bans or 
restrictions on certain financial products or activities which pose a 
threat to the “ . . . orderly functioning and integrity of financial 
markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in 
the Union . . . . ”125 In addition, the ESAs have been given direct 
supervisory powers with respect to certain areas of the financial 
system; this is the case of credit rating agencies and trade repositories, 
which are directly supervised by ESMA,126 and, in relation to which, 
the latter may impose fines127 or withdraw registration.128 The second 
                                                                                                             
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, arts. 290-291, 2012 O.J. C 
326/47.  
121. See, e.g., ESMA Regulation, supra note 117, recitals 5, 22; EBA Regulation, supra 
note 115, recitals 5, 22. 
122. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art. 32. 
123. Id. art 29. 
124. Id. art. 19. 
125. Id. art. 9.5. For instance, Regulation (EU) No. 600/2014 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending 
Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012, arts. 40-41, 2014 O.J. L 173/84 [hereinafter Markets in 
Financial Instruments Regulation (“MiFIR”)], respectively enable the ESMA and the EBA to 
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126. Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies, Title III, 2009 O.J. L 302/1; Regulation (EU) No. 
648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, 
central counterparties and trade repositories, Title IV, 2012 O.J. L 201/1 [hereinafter European 
Market Infrastructure Regulation (“EMIR”)]. 
127. With respect to credit rating agencies, see Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 
No. 946/2012 of 12 July 2012 supplementing Regulation (EC) No. 1060/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council with regard to rules of procedure on fines imposed to credit 
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pillar incorporates a forum of cooperation between the three ESAs, 
the Joint Committee, whose purpose is to ensure cross-sectoral 
consistency in regulation and supervision.129 
The third pillar regards the day-to-day macro-prudential and 
micro-prudential regulation, supervision and enforcement activities 
relating to markets and institutions at the Member State level. This is 
assigned to the CSAs from each jurisdiction.130 The ESFS attributes a 
central role to cooperation among its various levels. As will be further 
explained below, this is reflected in, among others, the configuration 
of a detailed regime of cooperation duties among the constituents of 
the ESFS. 
The economic downturn that followed the financial crisis 
evidenced the close connections between banking crises and 
sovereign debt risk, 131 as well as the dangers of spill over effects 
resulting from the latter within the euro area. 132  The Commission 
responded by proposing a Banking Union that would provide a 
system of common supervision, deposit protection, crisis management 
and resolution of banks in the European Union.133 This eventually 
materialized in the creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(“SSM”) in the year 2013, 134  of a Single Resolution Mechanism 
                                                                                                             
rating agencies by the European Securities and Markets Authority, including rules on the right 
of defence and temporal provisions, 2012 O.J. L 282/23. 
128. See EMIR, supra note 126, recital 74, art. 73. 
129. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, arts. 2.2(e), 54. 
130. See, e.g., ESMA Regulation, supra note 117, recital 9; ESAs Regulations, supra 
note 114, art. 2.2(f). 
131. On the relationship between both, see Philip R. Lane, The European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis, 26 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 49, 59 (2012). 
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133. Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council: A Roadmap towards a Banking Union, COM (2012) 510 final. 
134. The SSM was instituted by Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 of 15 October 
2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to 
the prudential supervision of credit institutions, 2013 O.J. L 287/63 [hereinafter SSM 
Regulation] and Regulation (EU) No. 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 establishing a 
European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of 
specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No. 
1024/2013, 2013 O.J. L 287/5. 
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(“SRM”) in the year 2014, 135  as well as in the formulation of 
proposals for a European Deposit Insurance Scheme (“EDIS”) in the 
year 2015.136 In the Banking Union, supervision is assigned to the 
SSM, which is a supervisory system made of the ECB and relevant 
CSAs of the Member States. 137  The SSM gives the ECB a pre-
eminent role in the post-crisis EU financial architecture by entrusting 
it with the direct prudential supervision of significant credit 
institutions138 in the Eurozone and in other Member States that decide 
to join the SSM. 139  CSAs remain responsible for the conduct of 
business supervision as well as the direct prudential supervision of 
less significant banks.140 
Both the ESFS and the Banking Union represent a shift from a 
system of fully decentralized supervision, primarily conducted at the 
Member State level and organized through cooperation agreements 
between CSAs, towards a system of greater centralization of 
supervisory functions at the EU level, while remaining, nonetheless, a 
decentralized system with multiple supervisory actors. Such 
centralization has two main dimensions. First, in the new framework, 
there has been a transfer of direct supervisory responsibilities from 
the Member State to the EU level. For example, as indicated above, in 
the ESFS, the ESMA has direct supervision powers with respect to 
credit rating agencies and trade repositories. In the SSM, the ECB 
exercises direct prudential supervision of credit institutions 
throughout the European Union. 141  Second, in the post-crisis EU 
financial services architecture, EU entities, such as the ESAs, have 
                                                                                                             
135. The SRM was instituted by Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform 
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137. SSM Regulation, supra note 134, art. 2. 
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140. CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES, ECB BANKING SUPERVISION AND 
BEYOND 59 (2014). 
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assumed important responsibilities in the coordination of financial 
supervision EU-wide; an example are emergency situations in which 
there are developments that “may seriously jeopardise the orderly 
functioning and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the 
whole or part of the financial system in the Union”; in those cases, the 
ESAs are entrusted with the facilitation and, even the coordination, of 
actions by CSAs of the Member States. 142  In addition, the ESFS 
confers on the ESAs the task of “…promoting and monitoring the 
efficient, effective and consistent functioning of the colleges of 
supervisors . . . . ”143 
The creation of the ESFS and the Banking Union, and the 
distribution of supervisory responsibilities within them to various 
actors along sectoral and functional lines have resulted in a 
multiplication of supervisory cooperation relationships. In the new 
setting, the performance of supervisory tasks by an authority 
operating in a given supervisory level–e.g. European Union or 
Member State–may require the cooperation of other authorities in the 
same or other levels. Moreover, certain supervisory actions are 
entrusted to various authorities. The post-crisis supervisory patchwork 
embraces three types of cooperation relationships. In the first place, 
supervisory cooperation applies to the relationship between the 
various pillars within both the ESFS and the Banking Union; for 
example, the initiation and coordination of stress tests to assess the 
resilience of financial market participants is jointly performed by and 
requires cooperation between the ESAs and the ESRB.144 Likewise, in 
the SSM, the performance of tasks relating to consumer protection 
and anti-money laundering require cooperation between the ECB and 
Member State CSAs.145 Second, there is a need for cooperation within 
each of the pillars of the ESFS and of the Banking Union; for 
example, the ESFS envisages cooperation between the ESAs in 
relation to, inter alia, financial conglomerates and cross-sectoral 
matters.146 Third, supervisory cooperation also takes place between 
the ESFS and the Banking Union bodies, notably, with respect to 
                                                                                                             
142. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art. 18.1. 
143. EIOPA Regulation, supra note 116, recital 35; ESMA Regulation, supra note 117, 
recital 36; EBA Regulation, supra note 115, recital 36. 
144. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art. 32. 
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matters of joint interest, and institutions operating across sectors.147 
The change in the nature of supervisory relationships has led to a 
redefinition of the EU regime of supervisory cooperation duties. The 
latter includes forms of both horizontal and vertical cooperation. 
On the one side, the general cooperation duties within the ESFS 
and the SSM encompass a notion of horizontal cooperation between 
their various constituent levels. With regard to the ESFS, the ESAs 
Regulations stipulate that: “In accordance with the principle of 
sincere cooperation under Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European 
Union, the parties to the ESFS shall cooperate with trust and full 
mutual respect, in particular in ensuring the flow of appropriate and 
reliable information between them.” 148  The SSM Regulation also 
implements a model of horizontal cooperation, between the ECB and 
the Member State CSAs: “Both the ECB and national competent 
authorities shall be subject to a duty of cooperation in good faith, and 
an obligation to exchange information.”149 
In specific supervisory contexts, the relationship between 
different authorities is hierarchical and asymmetrical, giving rise to 
forms of vertical cooperation that embrace ascendancy of some 
supervisors over others. This is particularly the case in certain 
relationships between the EU supervisory authorities and the Member 
State CSAs. For example, the general duties pertaining to exchange of 
information in the ESFS require that the CSAs of the Member States 
provide the ESAs information relevant to their supervisory functions, 
without establishing a corresponding duty for the ESAs:  
At the request of the Authority [an ESA], the competent 
authorities of the Member States shall provide the Authority with 
all the necessary information to carry out the duties assigned to 
it… Upon a duly justified request from a competent authority of 
a Member State, the Authority may provide any information that 
is necessary to enable the competent authority to carry out its 
duties…150  
The asymmetrical position of financial supervisors at the EU and 
Member State levels, respectively, is patent in areas where the former 
                                                                                                             
147. See, e.g., SSM Regulation, supra note 134, recital 31. 
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have direct supervisory powers; for example, in the SSM, the ECB 
may, in the exercise of its direct supervisory powers, issue 
instructions addressed to CSAs.151 
Both the ESFS and the Banking Union largely internalize the 
process of regulatory coordination on matters pertaining to 
supervisory cooperation through the creation of institutional 
mechanisms of joint decision-making led by CSAs from the Member 
States. For instance, the ESAs’ Boards of Supervisors, whose voting 
members are the heads of the Member State CSAs,152 are the main 
decision-making bodies of the ESAs and their powers include the 
adoption of draft technical standards, guidelines and 
recommendations. 153  Likewise, in the SSM, the formulation of 
rulemaking and supervisory decisions is entrusted to a Supervisory 
Board154 where most decision-making power rests in representatives 
of the Member State CSAs.155 This Member State-based governance 
structure 156  facilitates the debate and exchange of ideas among 
national authorities on matters pertaining to financial regulation and 
supervision, as well as to supervisory cooperation rules and processes, 
and, consequently, may contribute to foster the legitimacy of the 
latter. On the one side, from an input-legitimacy viewpoint, the joint 
decision-making process enables the engagement of all the CSAs 
affected by and subject to EU-wide supervisory cooperation rules and 
                                                                                                             
151. SSM Regulation, supra note 134, art. 6.3. 
152. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art. 40.1(b). 
153. Id. arts. 43.1-2. 
154. SSM Regulation, supra note 134, art 26.1. 
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delegated the adoption of draft implementing technical standards on “standard forms, 
templates and procedures for competent authorities to cooperate in supervisory activities, on-
site verifications, and investigations.” See also ESMA, Final Report. Draft implementing 
technical standards under MiFID II (ESMA/2015/1858), at 29-30; ESMA, Draft Implementing 
Technical Standards on forms and procedures for cooperation between competent authorities 
under Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 on market abuse (ESMA70-145-100) (developing a 
comprehensive framework of supervisory cooperation among the various CSAs and levels of 
the ESFS in the field of market abuse). 
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policies, in their creation; moreover, the adoption of decisions 
regarding supervisory cooperation rules and processes often requires 
qualified majority within the ESAs and the ECB, 157  and, hence, 
greater degrees of consensus among the Member State CSAs. On the 
other side, as regards output-legitimacy, the meetings of the Boards of 
Supervisors of the ESAs and of the Supervisory Board of the ECB 
operate as fora of transnational dialogue where CSAs can devise, 
together, supervisory cooperation policies tailored to their needs and 
expectations; this, in turn, may promote the acceptance of those 
policies among the CSAs concerned and further the effective 
functioning of financial sector supervisory cooperation in the 
European Union. 
The post-crisis EU financial services supervision architecture 
examined in this Part represents a shift towards a model of greater 
centralization and coordination of financial supervision, with potential 
benefits for the convergence, consistency and legitimacy of 
supervisory cooperation rules and procedures. 158  However, 
contemporarily, the model of centralized decentralization embraced 
by the ESFS and the Banking Union has substantially increased the 
complexity of the EU financial supervisory patchwork, which is now 
composed of a number of CSAs operating at various functional and 
jurisdictional levels and bound by a heterogeneous system of 
supervisory cooperation duties. This raises the question of whether 
                                                                                                             
157. For instance, the adoption of draft technical standards, guidelines and 
recommendations by the ESAs requires a qualified majority of the voting members of their 
Boards of Supervisors. See EBA, Decision adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European 
Banking Authority Board of Supervisors (EBA/DC/2011/001, Rev 4), art. 3.5; EIOPA, 
Decision adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Insurance and Occupational 
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supervisory cooperation within the SSM – see, e.g., Regulation (EU) No. 468/2014 of the 
European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for cooperation within 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national 
competent authorities and with national designated authorities –, by qualified majority of its 
members – see ECB, Rules of Procedure of the Supervisory Board of the European Central 
Bank (2014), art. 6.5; SSM Regulation, supra note 134, art. 26.7 . 
158 . Indeed, stakeholders seem to acknowledge that the creation of the ESAs has 
generally improved cooperation between CSAs. See European Parliament, Review of the New 
European System of Financial Supervision, Part 1: The Work of the European Supervisory 
Authorities (EBA, EIOPA and ESMA) (IP/A/ECON/ST/2012-23), at 143. 
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and how EU law is able to deal with such complexity and guarantee 
the effective functioning of supervisory cooperation. In order to 
answer this question the next Parts of this Article examine and assess 
key legal, regulatory and institutional aspects of the post-crisis EU 
financial supervisory cooperation architecture, their impact on the 
ability and incentives of CSAs to cooperate with each other as well as 
their contribution to the process of development of a single market for 
financial services. 
V. SUPERVISORY COOPERATION DUTIES AND THEIR LIMITS: 
THE ROLE OF MEMBER STATES’ DISCRETION 
Cooperation duties are not unconditional. From the outset, EU 
instruments have embraced limitations to the duty to cooperate which 
give CSAs certain degrees of discretion as regards the decision 
whether or not to cooperate in specific scenarios. The regime 
concerning waivers from supervisory cooperation has been 
particularly developed in the securities field, notably by the ESMA’s 
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation 
Arrangements and Exchange of Information (“ESMA MMoU”), 159 
which contains detailed rules and procedures regarding cooperation 
among CSAs and between CSAs and the ESMA. According to the 
ESMA MMoU, there are three reasons that may justify a refusal to 
cooperate by a requested CSA.160 
The first is that the request of cooperation falls outside the scope 
of the ESMA MMoU.161 This would, however, be a highly unlikely 
scenario, first and foremost because the ESMA MMoU offers a rather 
comprehensive list of potential areas and modes of cooperation.162 In 
addition, the wording of the ESMA MMoU leaves an open door to the 
inclusion of areas and forms of cooperation not expressly addressed 
by it; for instance, when referring to the subject-matter of 
cooperation, the ESMA MMoU stipulates that: “assistance includes 
but is not limited to matters relating to . . . ”;163 likewise, with respect 
to the forms of cooperation, the ESMA MMoU establishes that: “The 
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160. Id. art. 3.4. 
161. Id. art. 3.4(a). 
162. See, e.g., id. arts. 3.2-3. 
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scope of assistance available from the Requested Authority shall 
include, inter alia . . . ”164 In any event, a refusal to cooperate based 
on the above-mentioned justification, would only apply to requests of 
cooperation grounded on the ESMA MMoU. Therefore, a requested 
CSA may be entitled to withhold cooperation under the ESMA 
MMoU and, yet, be required to provide cooperation, if it is compelled 
to do so by EU or national laws. 
The second reason that may warrant the withholding of 
cooperation by a requested CSA, according to the ESMA MMoU, is 
that the law of a Member State allows such a refusal to cooperate.165 
This is, however, restricted to requests that are not grounded on EU 
law–i.e. when the requesting authority is not invoking a cooperation 
duty set in an EU Directive and/or Regulation. The progressive 
process of harmonization of EU securities laws has broadened the 
catalogue of areas of financial regulation subject to EU law and, 
consequently, to EU law-based cooperation duties, reducing, in turn, 
the scope of Member State law-based waivers from cooperation. 
Third, a refusal to cooperate may be founded upon an exception 
to the duty to cooperate acknowledged by EU law. 166  The EU 
legislator has not adopted a uniform approach to the treatment of 
these exceptions. As a result, the regime regarding the waivers from 
cooperation is a fragmented one and the scope of the CSAs’ 
cooperation duties varies according to the specific EU law or 
instrument under which a request of cooperation is issued. 
As will be shown in this Part, EU law waivers from supervisory 
cooperation pursue the protection of legitimate rights and interests 
that might be threatened by the actual provision of cooperation in 
particular cases. However, at the same time, those very same waivers 
give CSAs discretion as regards the interpretation of when and the 
extent to which such threats exist. Consequently, there is the potential 
risk of CSAs biasedly interpreting and invoking exceptions to the 
duty to cooperate in order to withhold cooperation in an opportunistic 
manner. This Part carries out a twofold analysis. First, it identifies the 
various exceptions to the duty to cooperate embraced by EU 
instruments and assesses the scope for their potential misuse. Second, 
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it examines the evolution of the legal treatment of those exceptions in 
order to answer an important question: has the process of integration 
of EU financial supervision led to a narrowing of the scope of the 
exceptions to the duty to cooperate and, consequently, to more limited 
degrees of discretion of the Member State CSAs in supervisory 
cooperation decisions? 
A. Waivers from Supervisory Cooperation Grounded on the Interest 
of a Member State 
A first category of waivers from the duty to cooperate refers to 
instances in which the provision of cooperation would have a negative 
effect on the protection of the interest –this concept broadly 
understood– of the Member State of the requested CSA. For example, 
some FSAP Directives–such as the Directive 2003/6/EC –Market 
Abuse Directive (“MAD”)– 167  and the Directive 2004/39/EC –
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID”)– 168 allowed 
CSAs to withhold cooperation when the latter “might adversely affect 
the sovereignty, security or public policy of the State addressed”.169 
The IOSCO MMoU also contemplates the possibility of a requested 
CSA denying cooperation “on grounds of public interest or essential 
national interest.” 170  These public interest-related exceptions gave 
CSAs substantial freedom in the interpretation of their duty to 
cooperate and, ultimately, in the decision of whether or not to 
cooperate in a specific case, opening the door to potentially 
protectionist behaviors; for instance, a requested CSA could use 
public interest-related exceptions opportunistically, withholding the 
exchange of information about firms operating in critical sectors–e.g. 
energy, military–or with major relevance for the economy, even in 
cases in which cooperation would pose no actual threat to the 
sovereignty, security or public policy in the Member State of the 
                                                                                                             
167. Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 
2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), 2003 O.J. L 96/16 
[hereinafter MAD]. 
168. Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 
2004 on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 
93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, 2004 O.J. L 145/1 [hereinafter MiFID]. 
169.  MAD, supra note 167, art. 16.4; MiFID, supra note 168, art. 59. 
170. IOSCO MMoU, supra note 26, art. 6(e)(iv). 
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requested CSA. EU laws have progressively limited the scope of 
waivers related to the protection of the interest of a Member State 
and, thus, the ability of CSAs to refuse cooperation on such grounds; 
for example, the Regulation No. 596/2014–Market Abuse Regulation 
(“MAR”)–, 171  which repeals the MAD, removed the references to 
threats to the “sovereignty” and “public policy”, and focused, instead, 
on cases in which the provision of cooperation “…could adversely 
affect the security of the Member State addressed, in particular the 
fight against terrorism and other serious crimes”.172 MiFID II, which 
partially recasts the MiFID, plainly eliminates any reference to 
waivers linked to the protection of the interest of a Member State.173 
Nonetheless, CSAs would still be entitled to deny cooperation in 
instances of threats to national security, as the latter is a Treaty-based 
exclusive competence of the EU Member States.174 
B. Waivers from Supervisory Cooperation Grounded on the Principle 
of Ne Bis In Idem 
A second category of waivers relates to instances of res sub 
judice and res judicata, and provides protection against double 
jeopardy through the principle of ne bis in idem. These anti-double 
jeopardy exceptions, which are common in EU laws and MoUs in the 
financial field, allow CSAs to withhold cooperation in two scenarios. 
First, when judicial proceedings have already been initiated with 
regard to the same actions and the same persons before the authorities 
of the Member State of the requested CSA.175 Second, when final 
judgment has already been delivered in the Member State of the 
requested CSA with regard to the same persons and the same 
actions. 176  These waivers do, however, pose certain problems of 
interpretation that will be examined in the next paragraphs. As will be 
shown, the evolution of the legal treatment of the anti-double 
                                                                                                             
171. Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 
2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, 2014 O.J.  L 173/1 [hereinafter MAR]. 
172. Id. art. 25.2(a). 
173. MiFID II, supra note 156, art. 83. 
174. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/13, art. 
4.2. 
175. See, e.g., MiFID II, supra note 156, art. 83(a); MAR, supra note 171, art. 25.2(c). 
176. See, e.g., MiFID II, supra note 156, art. 83(b); MAR, supra note 171, art. 25.2(d). 
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jeopardy exceptions –from their initial wording in the FESCO and 
CESR MoUs to their current form– evidences that, overall, their 
scope has been progressively broadened, and, consequently, the 
ability of CSAs to refuse cooperation, increased. 
The first question relates to the subject-matter jurisdictions 
covered by the anti-double jeopardy waivers. Whereas the FESCO 
and the CESR MoUs explicitly limited the lis pendens waivers to “ . . 
. judicial proceedings for the imposition of criminal penalties . . . . 
”177 the reference to “criminal penalties” is absent in most post-FSAP 
and post-crisis EU financial laws, which merely make reference to 
“judicial proceedings,” without specifying any particular subject-
matter. This raises the question of whether a refusal to cooperate 
might be grounded on the existence of judicial proceedings pertaining 
to matters beyond the criminal realm. Whereas the application of the 
principle of ne bis in idem has traditionally been limited to (national) 
criminal justice,178 over the years, the case law of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (“CJEU”) has construed it as a (transnational) 
general principle of EU law, not necessarily limited to the criminal 
jurisdiction but, instead, extendable to other types of judicial 
processes with a punitive nature.179 The omission of the reference to 
“criminal penalties” may suggest that anti-double jeopardy waivers 
embrace such EU law trend and extend to non-criminal jurisdictions –
e.g. civil jurisdiction cases. The practical effect of this approach is 
that the ability of CSAs to withhold cooperation would be broadened. 
A second issue regards to whether anti-double jeopardy waivers 
only apply to judicial proceedings/decisions or also include 
administrative actions–for example, when a requested CSA has 
already imposed a fine to a firm in relation to which the requesting 
CSA solicits information. According to both the FESCO MoU and the 
CESR MoU, administrative decisions were included in the anti-
double jeopardy waivers. In this respect, the former read: “ . . . where 
a non-appealable judicial or administrative sanction has already been 
                                                                                                             
177. See, e.g., FESCO MoU, supra note 73, art. 3.3; CESR MoU, supra note 88, art. 3.3. 
178. See John A.E. Vervaele, The Transnational Ne Bis In Idem Principle in the EU. 
Mutual Recognition and Equivalent Protection of Human Rights, 1 UTRECHT L. REV. 100, 100 
(2005). 
179. Id. at 106; B. VAN BOCKEL, THE NE BIS IN IDEM PRINCIPLE IN EU LAW 223 
(2010). 
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imposed . . . ”,180 and the latter referred to instances “ . . . where final 
judgement has already been passed or administrative sanctions have 
already been applied . . . . ”181 In contrast, in force MoUs and EU 
laws in the financial field seem to only explicitly include judicial 
decisions. 182  Traditionally, EU law has adopted an ambiguous 
approach to the treatment of administrative sanctions in the context of 
ne bis in idem, often excluding administrative punitive decisions from 
a strict application of such principle, with the result that the same 
facts could result in sanctions at various jurisdictional levels. 183 
Whereas some recent decisions of the CJEU encompass the notion 
that administrative punitive decisions would bar double 
prosecution,184 certain post-crisis EU legislative developments seem 
to take a very different view. For instance, the MAR acknowledges 
the possibility of the same offence being subject to both criminal and 
administrative sanctions.185 Recent case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights (“ECHR”) has taken a much clearer stand, arguing that 
administrative enforcement and criminal prosecution for the same 
actions are incompatible. Of particular relevance for financial market 
practice, is the decision of the ECHR in Grande Stevens and Others v. 
Italy. Grande Stevens and other defendants who committed market 
manipulation were, first, fined administratively by the Italian 
securities supervisor–the Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la 
Borsa (“Consob”)– 186  and, subsequently, subject to criminal 
proceedings for the same facts. The ECHR argued that this constitutes 
a breach of the principle of ne bis in idem embraced by Article 4 of 
Protocol 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights –regarding 
the right not to be tried or punished twice. In the framework of 
                                                                                                             
180. FESCO MoU, supra note 73, art. 3.3. 
181. CESR MoU, supra note 88, art. 3.3. 
182. See, e.g., MAR, supra note 171, art. 25.2(d). 
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184. See, e.g., Bonda, Case C-489/10, [2012] E.C.R. I-0000. Juliette Lelieur, 
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18647/10, 18663/10, 18668/10, 18698/10, Mar. 4, 2014 Judgment, at 16, 34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
2014). For a comment of this case see generally, Marco Ventoruzzo, Do Market Abuse Rules 
Violate Human Rights? The Grande Stevens v. Italy Case (European Corporate Governance 
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cooperation between CSAs, it remains unclear what the scope of anti-
double jeopardy waivers would be, in this respect. Even a full 
encompassment, by EU law and case law, of the applicability of the 
ne bis in idem principle to administrative sanctions, would not 
necessarily extend to cooperation duties of CSAs–but, rather, to their 
enforcement procedures. The silence of in force anti-double jeopardy 
waivers on this matter, jointly with their emphasis on “judicial” 
decisions, would indicate that the intention of the EU legislator was to 
exclude administrative sanctions from the scope of such waivers. This 
would, in turn, limit the ability of CSAs to decline cooperation. For 
instance, the fact that the requested authority had already imposed a 
fine with regard to the same persons and actions would not, per se, 
enable it to withhold cooperation. 
A third important question refers to the extent to which anti-
double jeopardy waivers also embrace instances in which the request 
of assistance is not aimed at bringing judicial proceedings or punitive 
administrative enforcement against a person involved in the actions to 
which the request of cooperation refers, for those very same actions–
and/or may not result in those proceedings being brought in the 
jurisdiction of the requesting CSA. This would, for example, be the 
case of a request of cooperation about facts relating to and/or persons 
involved in a given securities laws violation, when such a request is 
merely instrumental to another supervisory or enforcement procedure 
relating to different actions and/or persons. The FESCO MoU offered 
a rather straightforward answer to this question by limiting the 
applicability of the anti-double jeopardy waivers to instances in which 
“ . . . the provision of assistance might result in a judicial or 
administrative sanction being imposed… in the jurisdiction of the 
Requested Authority, in respect of the same actions and against the 
same persons.”187 A similar approach is found in the IOSCO MMoU, 
which permits the requested CSA to refuse cooperation “ . . . unless 
the Requesting Authority can demonstrate that the relief or sanctions 
sought in any proceedings initiated by the Requesting Authority 
would not be of the same nature or duplicative of any relief or 
sanctions obtained in the jurisdiction of the Requested Authority.”188 
This is, however, an aspect in relation to which contemporary EU 
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MoUs and legislation are silent, hence opening the door to rigid 
interpretations that could back the withholding of cooperation, just 
because a given request refers to the same actions and persons. 
C. Waivers from Supervisory Cooperation Grounded on the Interest 
of a Competent Supervisory Authority 
There is a third category of cooperation waivers aimed at 
protecting administrative investigation and enforcement activities in 
the jurisdiction of the requested CSA. Such type of waiver was 
introduced in the year 2014 by the MAR, which allows a requested 
CSA to deny cooperation when: “complying with the request is likely 
adversely to affect its own investigation, enforcement activities or, 
where applicable, a criminal investigation.”189 Although the reference 
to “its own investigation and enforcement activities” can be 
interpreted as referring to supervision regarding the same actions and 
persons to which the request of cooperation refers, the subsequent 
allusion to “a criminal investigation” seems to have a broader scope; 
for example, it may be interpreted as including criminal investigations 
by the requested CSA, relating to different persons and/or actions –or 
even, more generally, to criminal investigations conducted in the 
jurisdiction of the requested CSA by bodies different from the latter. 
To a certain extent, the MAR expands the cooperation waivers from 
the judicial to the, primarily administrative, non-judicial stage of an 
investigation and/or enforcement action, but with a more restricted 
character, i.e. only when the provision of cooperation has a likely 
negative effect on investigation and/or enforcement activities in the 
requested jurisdiction. From the point of view of the rights of the 
CSAs of different Member States involved in a given investigation, 
this waiver from cooperation poses some problems, because it 
implicitly attributes greater weight and primacy to an investigation 
and/or enforcement activity in the jurisdiction of the requested CSA–
which is entitled to decline cooperation–than to an investigation 
and/or enforcement action in the jurisdiction of the requesting CSA, 
which may equally suffer negative effects if the requested CSA 
withholds cooperation on the grounds of the interest of its own 
investigations. 
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The analysis of the evolution of the content of the exceptions to 
the duty to cooperate from their early configuration in the FESCO and 
CESR MoUs to their current form –for example, in force EU 
Directives and Regulations– shows that, whereas the scope of some 
waivers has been narrowed, in certain instances it has been expanded 
and, consequently, the ability of CSAs to withhold cooperation 
increased. Indeed, despite the greater degrees of supervisory 
integration and centralization brought by the post-de Larosiére 
framework, the regime concerning supervisory cooperation 
exceptions still grants considerable discretion to the Member State 
CSAs. One of the risks of such regime lies in its lack of clarity and 
definition, opening the door to dissimilar interpretations across the 
Member States. More importantly, it may result in potential 
opportunistic behaviors by CSAs, which may justify the withholding 
of cooperation on the basis of biased readings of the exceptions to the 
duty to cooperate. Ultimately, disagreeing interpretations of the scope 
of the duties–and exceptions–to cooperate bring about the risk of 
increased supervisory dissent across the European Union. The next 
Part examines and assesses post-crisis regulatory developments that 
have instituted mechanisms of solution of disagreements among 
CSAs, including instances of supervisory cooperation disputes. 
VI. THE ESFS, THE EMERGENCE OF THE ESAS AS SETTLERS 
OF SUPERVISORY COOPERATION DISPUTES, AND THE 
INCENTIVES OF CSAS TO COOPERATE 
An important development brought about by the ESFS consisted 
of the institutionalization of a rather formal dispute settlement 
framework in which the ESAs are given extensive powers to resolve 
disagreements between CSAs. These powers are instrumental to the 
attainment of one of the key tasks of the ESAs, namely enhancing the 
consistent application of legally binding Union acts. 190  Such 
consistency may be hindered when, for example, CSAs have different 
views about whether and how they are expected to cooperate with 
each other or with the ESAs–as required by EU law. 
The ESAs have been vested with various mechanisms, some 
general and others ad hoc, that can be used to address instances of 
lack of compliance with cooperation duties by CSAs. In contrast with 
                                                                                                             
190. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art. 8.1(b). 
2018] SUPERVISORY COOPERATION IN SINGLE MARKET 631 
the Lamfalussy Committees, some of these mechanisms embrace the 
use of binding powers by the ESAs. The allocation of dispute 
settlement powers to the ESAs raises various questions that are 
relevant to understand and assess the post-crisis transformation of 
supervisory cooperation in the European Union. A first question 
relates to the nature, scope and limitations of the ESAs’ instruments 
of dispute settlement. The answer to this question is useful to respond 
to a second question, namely, whether and why these new 
mechanisms of dispute settlement may have an actual impact on the 
incentives of CSAs to cooperate. Third, by performing a quasi-
judicial role in relation to CSAs, the ESAs are potentially subject to 
conflicts of interest that may affect their ability to solve disputes in an 
unbiased manner; it is, hence, important to understand the sources of 
such conflicts as well as the extent to which these are properly tackled 
by the EU regulatory and institutional frameworks. The next Sections 
explore these issues through an analysis of the nature, scope and 
potential effects of the ESAs’ dispute settlement mechanisms, in 
respect of both the ESFS and the Banking Union. 
A. The Mediation Mechanism of Article 19 of the ESAs Regulations: 
Scope and Limitations 
The core mechanism of dispute settlement between CSAs is 
provided by Article 19 of the ESAs Regulations, whereby the ESAs 
may mediate between CSAs in cases “…where a competent authority 
disagrees about the procedure or content of an action or inaction of a 
competent authority…in cases specified in [legally binding Union 
acts] . . . . ” 191  This provision embraces, inter alia, instances of 
cooperation disputes between CSAs, such as those arising when a 
requested CSA refuses to provide information to a requesting CSA. 
The reference to both ‘content’ and ‘procedure’ amplifies the reach of 
the ESAs’ mediation powers to, not only cases in which a request of 
cooperation is rejected, but also instances in which a requesting CSA 
is not satisfied with the quality of the cooperation provided –e.g. if the 
requesting CSA deems the information provided by the requested 
CSA to be incomplete or inadequate. The mediation mechanism of 
Article 19 consists of a one-to-three step process, where progression 
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to each consecutive step depends on whether a solution is reached or 
not in the previous. 
In step one (conciliation), an ESA mediates between the CSAs in 
disagreement, assisting them in the reaching of a solution. The 
conciliation step may be initiated at the request of CSA(s) or on an 
ESA’s own initiative–in the latter case, whenever the disagreement 
can be determined on the basis of objective criteria.192 The role of an 
ESA at this stage is that of a mere facilitator of cooperation between 
the CSAs in dispute.193 If the CSAs do not reach a solution within a 
time limit specified by the relevant ESA,194 then the latter may decide 
to proceed to step two. 
In step two (binding mediation), an ESA adopts a binding 
decision addressed to the CSAs in dispute that settles the 
disagreement, by requiring them to take specific action or refrain 
from it.195 An example would be a decision whereby a requested CSA 
must provide certain information to a requesting CSA. Step two-
decisions are binding and, therefore, CSAs are expected to comply 
with them. However, if they do not do so, then an ESA may proceed 
to step three. 
In step three (direct binding decision), an ESA adopts an 
individual decision addressed to a financial market participant. Such 
decision requires it to take specific action or refrain from it.196 This 
mechanism is aimed at guaranteeing that, when a CSA does not 
comply with a binding mediation decision, the market participants 
concerned follow courses of action that, somehow, overcome the 
failure of a CSA to observe an ESA’s settlement. 
The mediation process is led by Mediation Panels within each 
ESA. 197  These panels are appointed by the respective Boards of 
Supervisors and composed of the Chair of an ESA plus two members 
–six in the EBA–of its Board of Supervisors who neither represent the 
CSAs in disagreement nor have direct links with the latter or any 
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interest in the dispute.198 The decisions of a Mediation Panel with a 
proposed binding settlement are forwarded to the relevant Board of 
Supervisors for final adoption, 199  which generally requires simple 
majority of its members.200 
The powers of the ESAs under Article 19 are much more 
extensive than those held by the Lamfalussy Committees. In the first 
place, the powers of the Lamfalussy Committees were not binding,201 
unlike those of the ESAs, which may settle a disagreement between 
CSAs through a binding decision. Second, the ESAs can, at their own 
discretion –where disagreements are objectively determinable–, step 
into a dispute and initiate a mediation process, whereas the 
Lamfalussy Committees were able to play a mediation role, only after 
a request from a CSA.202 Despite the width of the powers granted to 
the ESAs under Article 19, there are some important limitations and 
interpretative problems regarding their application to instances of 
supervisory dissent. 
First, the mechanism of Article 19 can only be applied when an 
EU legally binding act explicitly backs such use –and only for the 
purposes specified in it. 203  EU financial sector Directives and 
Regulations take different stances in this respect, some being more 
restrictive than others. For example, Article 82 of MiFID II embraces 
a far-reaching application of Article 19, enabling its use to address 
disagreements between CSAs “where a request relating to one of the 
following has been rejected or has not been acted upon within a 
reasonable time: (a) to carry out a supervisory activity, an on-the-spot 
verification, or an investigation, as provided for in Article 80; or (b) 
to exchange information as provided for in Article 81.” In contrast, 
Article 23.4 of the Regulation No. 236/2012 (“Short Selling 
Regulation”),204 provides for a more narrow application of Article 19, 
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limiting its use to instances where “a competent authority disagrees 
with the action taken by another competent authority on a financial 
instrument traded on different venues regulated by different 
competent authorities . . . . ” 
Second, step two and step three of the mediation mechanism 
require the existence of a breach of EU law, which the mediation 
process aims to put to an end to. For example, as indicated above, 
when a requested CSA withholds information that a requesting 
authority has the right to access and which the requested CSA ought 
to provide–according to the general duty of cooperation between 
CSAs and/or concrete cooperation duties set in EU financial laws–, 
there would be a breach of EU law and the ESA concerned would, 
hence, be entitled to use a step two-binding decision to settle the 
disagreement–if the conciliatory phase failed. However, cooperation 
disputes founded on breaches of domestic laws establishing specific 
cooperation duties would be excluded from this mediation 
mechanism, as long as they do not imply a breach of EU law. 
Likewise, discretionary actions by Member State CSAs, based on 
explicit or implicit EU legislative delegations, are shielded from and 
cannot be superseded by ESAs' binding mediation decisions, as long 
as the exercise of such discretion is in compliance with EU law.205 
In addition, the general applicability of step three-decisions to 
supervisory cooperation disputes is questionable. In this respect, 
section 3 of Article 19 of the ESAs Regulations stipulates that:  
. . . where a competent authority does not comply with the 
decision of the Authority, and thereby fails to ensure that a 
financial market participant complies with requirements directly 
applicable to it by virtue of the acts referred to in Article 1(2), the 
Authority may adopt an individual decision addressed to a 
financial market participant requiring the necessary action to 
comply with its obligations under Union law . . . .  
Therefore, Article 19.3 seems to limit the applicability of direct 
binding decisions to instances in which lack of compliance of a CSA 
with an ESA’s binding mediation decision also results in and/or 
implies lack of compliance of a market participant with EU law.206 
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This is, however, not necessarily the case in cooperation disputes. For 
instance, when a CSA does not abide by a binding decision of an 
ESA, it may be breaching EU law–for example, general cooperation 
duties– without this necessarily resulting in a consequential breach of 
EU law by a market participant. These limitations to the powers of the 
ESAs in the use of step two and step three-decisions are, indeed, 
consistent with the Meroni doctrine, according to which EU 
institutions cannot delegate discretionary powers that involve wide 
margins of discretion.207 
Third, the safeguard clause of Article 38 of the ESAs 
Regulations, whereby step two-mediation decisions must not impinge 
on the fiscal responsibilities of the Member States, might also pose 
some limitations to the use of binding mediation by an ESA, notably 
in the context of resolution disputes.208 If a Member State considers 
that there is such an impingement, it may trigger a procedure that 
involves the binding decision of the ESA being suspended, 
reconsidered by the latter, and whenever maintained, subject to 
scrutiny by the Council, which decides whether to uphold it or not.209 
Nevertheless, owing to the creation of the Single Resolution 
Mechanism and the transfer of resolution authority to the Single 
Resolution Board, the room for decisions of an ESA regarding 
resolution disputes with an impact on the fiscal responsibilities of the 
Member States is more reduced and so is the scope for invoking a 
breach of Article 38. 
In addition to the procedure for the challenge of decisions of 
Article 38 of the ESAs Regulations, which is restricted to instances 
when an ESA’s binding decision invades the fiscal responsibilities of 
a Member State, CSAs are entitled to challenge mediation decisions 
                                                                                                             
207. Meroni v. High Authority, Case 9/56, [1957-58] E.C.R. 133. On the different views 
about the scope of discretion of the ESAs in the use of Art. 19, see NIAMH MOLONEY, EU 
SECURITIES AND FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATION 980 (3d ed. 2014). 
208 . IMF, EUROPEAN UNION: PUBLICATION OF FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT 
PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION - TECHNICAL NOTE ON PROGRESS WITH BANK RESTRUCTURING 
AND RESOLUTION IN EUROPE, COUNTRY REPORT 13/67, 15 (2013); House of Lords EU 
Economic and Financial Affairs Sub-Committee (UK), Correspondence with Ministers, Letter 
from the Rt. Hon. Greg Clark MP to the Chairman (June 7, 2013), 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-com-a/CWM/cwm2013-
14/CwMsubA9May13-30Nov13-.pdf [https://perma.cc/663J-NQ65] (archived Mar. 8, 2018). 
209. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art. 38. 
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adopted by the ESAs before the ESAs’ Board of Appeal, 210  and, 
eventually, before the CJEU; 211 this remedy could for instance be 
used when a CSA deems an ESA’s decision arbitrary or adopted 
without following applicable statutory procedural requirements. 
A potential additional limitation of the mediation mechanism of 
Article 19 relates to the nature of the organs in charge of adopting 
binding decisions. The voting power within both the Mediation Panels 
and the Boards of Supervisors –which are in charge of proposing and 
adopting binding decisions, respectively– is primarily concentrated in 
representatives of CSAs;212 it is unclear the extent to which these may 
be able to vote impartially, merely on the facts of the dispute at stake 
in a given case. The political economy of voting in binding mediation 
processes may be influenced by factors such as the relationships and 
mutual interests between the voting members of a Board of 
Supervisors and the CSAs in dispute; this may in turn create 
distortions, especially when voting procedures are not secret.213 For 
example, a member of a Board of Supervisors may be reluctant to cast 
a vote against the interest of a certain CSA in a particular cooperation 
dispute for fear of negative repercussions in the cooperation 
relationships with that CSA in the future. In September 2017 the 
Commission presented a legislative proposal that, if adopted by the 
EU legislature, would shift decision-making power in the mediation 
mechanism from the ESAs’ Boards of Supervisors to new bodies of 
the ESAs, namely the Executive Boards, made of independent full-
                                                                                                             
210. Id. art. 60.1. This is a joint body of the ESAs composed of six members and six 
alternates with high repute and proven experience in financial services and who are not 
employed by national or Union institutions involved in the activities of the ESAs –see id. art. 
58.2. 
211. Id. art. 61.1. 
212 . In the Mediation Panels, the voting members are the Chairpersons and the 
representatives from CSAs –see id. art. 41.2. In the Boards of Supervisors, the voting members 
are the representatives of CSAs –see id. art. 44.1. 
213. The standard voting procedure in the Boards of Supervisors of the ESAs seems to 
be the show of hands vote, but the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Supervisors also 
acknowledge the possibility of secret voting for certain matters –see, e.g., EBA, Decision 
adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Banking Authority Board of Supervisors 
(EBA/DC/2011/001, Rev 4), art. 7.5 –, and/or upon request of some of its members –see, e.g., 
EIOPA, Decision adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority Board of Supervisors (EIOPA-BoS-11/002, Rev3), art. 4.7. 
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time members –so as to address, inter alia, potential conflicts of 
interest as those above-referred.214 
1. Does the Mediation Mechanism of Article 19 of the ESAs 
Regulations Have an Impact on the Incentives of CSAs to Cooperate? 
A relevant question relating to Article 19’s mediation 
mechanism is whether and how it may impact supervisory 
cooperation between CSAs and deter them from undue lack of 
cooperation. In order to answer this question it is first important to 
understand the costs resulting from the application of the mediation 
mechanism–especially when it escalates to step two. Binding 
mediation may result in costs for both the requesting and requested 
CSAs.  
On the one side, a binding mediation of an ESA overturning a 
non-cooperation decision of a requested CSA may result in certain 
costs for the latter. In the first place, the binding decision will have 
                                                                                                             
214. See Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council Amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory 
Authority (European Banking Authority); Regulation (EU) No. 1094/2010 establishing a 
European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority); 
Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Securities and Markets Authority); Regulation (EU) No. 345/2013 on European venture capital 
funds; Regulation (EU) No. 346/2013 on European social entrepreneurship funds; Regulation 
(EU) No. 600/2014 on markets in financial instruments; Regulation (EU) 2015/760 on 
European long-term investment funds; Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 on indices used as 
benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of 
investment funds; and Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 on the prospectus to be published when 
securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, COM (2017) 
536 final, at 20, 22, 23 and 68 [hereinafter Commission Proposal on the Review of the ESAs]; 
see also Commission, Commission Staff Working Document. Impact Assessment 
Accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory 
Authority (European Banking Authority), Regulation (EU) No. 1094/2010 establishing a 
European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), 
Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Securities and Markets Authority), Regulation (EU) No. 345/2013 on European venture capital 
funds, Regulation (EU) No. 346/2013 on European social entrepreneurship funds, Regulation 
(EU) No. 600/2014 on markets in financial instruments, Regulation (EU) 2015/760 on 
European long-term investment funds, Regulation (EU) 2016/2011 on indices used as 
benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of 
investment funds, Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 on the prospectus to be published when 
securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, SWD(2017) 
308 final, at 46-7 [hereinafter Impact Assessment on the Commission Proposal on the Review 
of the ESAs]. 
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the immediate result of compelling the CSA concerned to perform an 
action–e.g the forwarding of information to the requesting CSA– that 
it likely deems prejudicial to its own interests and/or the interests of 
actors that it is bound to protect, such as investors or consumers of 
financial services in its jurisdiction. Second, a binding mediation may 
limit the discretion of a CSA in deciding whether to cooperate or not 
in the future, because its decisions in that regard will be largely bound 
by what an ESA has ruled in prior binding mediation procedures. In 
this respect, the binding mediation constitutes a quasi-regulatory tool 
through which the ESAs can shape the behavior of CSAs, by 
signaling the preferences of the former about the extent and scope of 
cooperation that the latter are expected to provide in similar instances 
as those being subject to a mediation process. It follows that a CSA 
whose decision not to cooperate in a particular case has been 
overturned by an ESA, may, in the future, adjust its supervisory 
behavior to the expectations of such ESA–even when those 
supervisory courses of action are contrary to the policy views and 
preferences of the CSA concerned–, in order to avoid the threat of 
binding mediation processes being initiated. Third, owing to the fact 
that binding mediation decisions must be approved by the Boards of 
Supervisors of the ESAs, 215 and that, consequently, the nature and 
scope of the disagreements are made known to fellow CSAs within an 
ESA,216 the reputation of the CSAs whose non-cooperative actions 
are upturned, vis-à-vis other CSAs, may be hindered–especially 
whenever an ESA justifies its binding decision on an alleged lack of 
consistency and/or reasonableness of the requested CSA’s behavior. 
Because binding mediation may bring about important costs for a 
requested CSA, the latter will tailor its behavior to the assessment of 
the likeliness of an ESA’s mediation process being initiated, either at 
the demand of the requesting CSA or on an ESA’s own initiative. 
Likewise, the threat of binding mediation may contribute to deter a 
                                                                                                             
215. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, arts. 19.3,  44.1. 
216. The proposal for a binding mediation decision that a Mediation Panel submits to a 
Board of Supervisors for approval in the binding mediation stage must include, among others: 
the identity of the CSAs involved in the dispute; the opinion of the Mediation Panel on how to 
settle the disagreement, as well as the reasons on which it is based; and, if appropriate, the 
deadline by which the CSAs addressed by the decision should take action or refrain from it. 
The proposed decision must also be accompanied by materials indicating the views of the 
CSAs concerned about the proposed settlement –see, e.g., ESMA, Decision of the Board of 
Supervisors. Rules of procedure of the Mediation Panel (ESMA/2012/BS/86), arts. 7.6-7. 
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requested CSA from arbitrary or inconsistent non-cooperation 
decisions that could potentially trigger the mediation process–or, if 
the latter is initiated, to revise its decision in the conciliatory phase. 
On the other side, a decision adopted by an ESA in the context 
of a binding mediation may also create costs for the requesting CSA. 
By submitting a dispute to an ESA for mediation, the requesting 
authority is, in fact, shifting decisional power away from the 
requested CSA to the relevant ESA. Hence, the mere request of an 
ESA’s intervention through mediation may harm the trust of the 
requested authority in the requesting authority, impairing the 
relationships between them.217 This may, in turn, affect the quality of 
future cooperation; for instance, a requested CSA may be more 
reluctant to voluntarily disclose unsolicited information that could, 
nonetheless, be useful for the requesting CSA. A requesting CSA will 
apply for an ESA’s mediation if the potential costs resulting from 
such a request are lower than the potential benefits of the provision of 
cooperation stemming from an ESA’s mediation. This will, most 
likely, be limited to very relevant supervisory procedures–e.g. with a 
major impact on the markets and actors in the jurisdiction of the 
requesting CSA– and where the probability of an ESA’s decision 
upholding the requesting CSA’s demands vis-à-vis the requested CSA 
are high–e.g. if and when the grounds for lack of cooperation by the 
requested CSA are weak. 
The data regarding the use of mediation by the ESAs would 
support the hypothesis of Article 19’s deterrent effect. For instance, 
since the ESAs became operative, only the EBA applied the 
mediation process of Article 19; this happened in two occasions, both 
in the year 2014, and, in both cases, the disagreement was settled in 
step one of the process, that is, in the conciliation phase.218 In its 
Annual Report of the year 2015, the EBA did, indeed, highlight its 
pre-eminently informal role in the settlement of disagreements 
between CSAs: “Although there have been several cases of 
disagreements between CAs, during 2015 the EBA has not been 
approached with a request to provide its assistance in one of these 
formal procedures on mediation. Nonetheless, the EBA played an 
                                                                                                             
217. See, e.g., Eilis Ferran, The Existential Search of the European Banking Authority, 
17 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 285, 307 (2016). 
218. EBA, ANNUAL REPORT 2014, 56 (2015). 
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important role in providing its assistance to settle disagreements 
between CAs in an informal way”.219 The Commission’s review of 
the ESFS acknowledged the potentially dissuasive effect of the 
binding mediation mechanism, recognizing, at the same time, the 
“lack of clarity” of the ESAs Regulations with respect to the scope of 
binding mediation, suggesting that this may be addressed in future 
reforms of the ESAs Regulations.220 
2. The Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Single Resolution 
Mechanism and the Role of the EBA as a Mediator Between the 
Banking Union EU Level Supervisory Structures and Member State 
CSAs 
The creation of the SSM and the SRM and the allocation of 
direct supervisory responsibilities within these structures to the ECB 
and the SRB, respectively, have led to a reconfiguration of the 
supervisory relationships within the EU financial supervision 
architecture. Under the SSM and the SRM, both the ECB and the 
SRB are bound by cooperation duties vis-à-vis CSAs and the EBA as 
well as between each other. Supervisory cooperation is given a central 
role within the SSM: “It is essential for the smooth functioning of the 
SSM that there is full cooperation between the ECB and NCAs and 
that they exchange all the information that may have an impact on 
their respective tasks . . . ” 221  Likewise, the SRM Regulation 
embraces close supervisory cooperation of the SRB with the EBA–
and, where appropriate, also with the ESRB, the ESMA, the EIOPA 
and other supervisory authorities in the ESFS–, the ECB and other 
                                                                                                             
219. EBA, ANNUAL REPORT 2015, 83 (2016). In the early stages of development of the 
EBA, its Chairperson –Andrea Enria– described the EBA’s binding mediation “more as a 
nuclear deterrent than an actual power.” –House of Lords (UK), Unrevised transcript of 
evidence taken before the Select Committee on the European Union; Economic and Financial 
Affairs and International Trade (Sub-Committee A). Inquiry on EU Financial Supervisory 
Framework (May 3, 2011), at 3. 
220. Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European 
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), COM (2014) 509 final, at 7. 
221. Regulation (EU) No. 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 
establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between 
the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated 
authorities (ECB/2014/17), recital 11, 2014 O.J. L 141/1 [hereinafter SSM Framework 
Regulation]. 
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supervisory authorities within the SSM, as well as with resolution 
authorities.222 
Under the EBA Regulation, both the ECB and the SRB are 
deemed CSAs and, hence, subject to the EBA’s supervisory remit.223 
The regulatory framework acknowledges the applicability of the 
EBA’s mediation mechanism to supervisory cooperation disputes 
involving the ECB and the SRB. As regards the ECB, the EBA’s 
Rules of Procedure for the Settlement of Disagreements between 
Competent Authorities, stipulate that: “In view of the supervisory 
tasks conferred on the ECB by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013, the 
EBA should be able to carry out its tasks also in relation to the ECB 
in the same manner as in relation to the other competent 
authorities.” 224  Also, the SRM Regulation recognizes that, for the 
purposes of the Directive 2014/59/EU –Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive (“BRRD”)–, the SRB is bound by the EBA’s 
mediation decisions.225 
The scope of applicability of the mediation mechanism is more 
limited in respect of the SRB than the ECB. This is because, 
according to the EBA Regulation, the SRB will be considered a CSA 
–and, hence, subject to the EBA’s mediation processes and decisions– 
only when and if it is not exercising discretionary powers or making 
policy choices.226 Owing to the fact that supervision and resolution 
tasks generally embrace the exercise of margins of discretion, the 
potential role of the EBA as a settler of disagreements involving the 
SRB will be very narrow.227 
The efficient functioning of the principal-agent institutional 
design, on which both the SSM and the SRM are based,228 requires a 
smooth interaction between EU level CSAs–namely, the ECB and the 
                                                                                                             
222. SRM Regulation, supra note 135, recital 89. 
223. EBA Regulation, supra note 115, arts. 4.2(i), (iv). 
224. EBA, Decision adopting the Rules of Procedure for the settlement of disagreements 
between competent authorities (EBA/DC/2014/091, Rev 1), recital 4. 
225. SRM Regulation, supra note 135, art. 5.2. 
226. EBA Regulation, supra note 115, art. 4.2(iv). 
227 . On the limitations to the EBA’s binding mediation powers resulting from the 
‘discretionary powers’ exception, see Niamh Moloney, European Banking Union: assessing its 
risks and resilience, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1609, 1669 (2014). 
228. For an application of the principal-agent model to the analysis of the SSM, see 
Jakub Gren, David Howarth, & Lucia Quaglia, Supranational Banking Supervision in Europe: 
The Construction of a Credible Watchdog, 53 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 181 (2015). 
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SRB– on the one side, and the Member State CSAs on the other. For 
instance, in the SSM, the ECB largely relies on CSAs for the 
enforcement of prudential regulation229 and, in the SRM, the SRB 
delegates the execution of resolution schemes to national resolution 
authorities. 230  In addition, the SSM and the SRM are mutually 
dependent and require a close cooperation between the ECB and the 
SRB in tasks such as the development of recovery and resolution 
plans.231 For reasons similar to those explained above with regard to 
the ESFS, the activation of the mediation mechanism could lead to 
costs for both requesting and requested CSAs within the SSM and the 
SRM. Therefore, it would most likely be relied upon only as a last 
resort mechanism in exceptional circumstances. 
B. Disagreements Between the ESAs and CSAs: the ESAs as 
Interested Parties and Judges 
As has been explained in the preceding Parts, the ESFS 
encompasses a series of supervisory cooperation duties between the 
ESAs and CSAs, raising the possibility of disagreements about the 
rationale, grounds, extent and scope of those duties in concrete 
supervisory scenarios. Although the ESAs Regulations do not offer ad 
hoc mechanisms of settlement of cooperation disputes between the 
ESAs and CSAs, they, nevertheless, embrace instruments that can be 
used for such purpose. An example is Article 17 of the ESAs 
Regulations, which institutes a three-level procedure to address 
breaches of EU law by CSAs. In the first stage, an ESA is empowered 
to investigate alleged breaches of EU law by a CSA and to issue 
recommendations directed to the latter with indications on the steps to 
take so as to remedy such breaches.232 If the CSA concerned fails to 
comply with the recommendation, then there is a second stage where 
the Commission may issue a formal opinion, requiring the CSA to 
                                                                                                             
229. T.H. Tröger, A political economy perspective on common supervision in the 
Eurozone: Observations on some strengths and weaknesses of the SSM, in FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE 177 (Faia et al. eds., 2015). 
230. E. Wymeersch, Banking Union; Aspects of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and 
the Single Resolution Mechanism compared, 5 (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 290/2015, 
2015). 
231. E. Angelopoulou, Resolution Planning from a Supervisors Perspective, FinSAC 
Workshop (Vienna, Apr. 24, 2015), at 12-13. 
232. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, arts. 17.1-3. 
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take action to comply with EU law.233 Lastly, if the CSA fails to 
observe the Commission’s opinion, then the process may move to a 
third stage where an ESA is vested with the power to issue an 
individual binding decision directly addressed to a financial 
institution, in order to remedy the lack of compliance with EU law.234 
Whereas the mechanism envisaged by Article 17 of the ESAs 
Regulations is primarily aimed at tackling instances in which a CSA 
fails to ensure that supervised entities comply with EU financial 
sector laws,235 its scope of applicability is broad, as it may be used by 
an ESA “Where a competent authority has not applied the acts 
referred to in Article 1(2), or has applied them in a way which appears 
to be a breach of Union law . . . . ”236 On the one side, this would 
include cases where a CSA fails to comply with cooperation duties 
vis-à-vis other CSAs but where there is no apparent express 
disagreement between the CSAs concerned and the mechanism of 
Article 19 is not deployed.237 On the other side, it could also comprise 
instances in which a CSA breaches cooperation duties set in EU acts 
vis-à-vis the ESAs. As regards the latter, the cooperation mandates 
instituted by EU financial sector laws are rather all-encompassing; for 
example, according to the Short Selling Regulation: “The competent 
authorities shall cooperate with ESMA for the purposes of this 
Regulation…The competent authorities shall provide, without delay, 
ESMA with all the information necessary to carry out its duties”.238 
As a result, the ESAs may enjoy substantial discretion in the actual 
determination of the extent and scope of the supervisory cooperation 
duties of CSAs towards them. 
The application of Article 17 of the ESAs Regulations to 
supervisory cooperation disputes between an ESA and a CSA would 
raise the question of the ability of the former to exercise independent 
judgment because, in those instances, an ESA would be acting, both 
as one of the parties to the dispute and as a judge. This would pose 
                                                                                                             
233. Id. art. 17.4. 
234. Id. art. 17.6. 
235. Id. art. 17.1. 
236. Id. 
237. The Chairperson of an ESA may determine, on a case-by-case basis, that mediation 
is more suitable for dealing with an alleged breach of EU law –see, e.g., EBA, Decision 
adopting Rules of Procedure for Investigation of Breach of Union Law (EBA/DC/2014/100), 
Annex 2. 
238. Short Selling Regulation, supra note 204, art. 36. 
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some legitimacy concerns, especially in light of the extensive powers 
conferred on the ESAs throughout the various stages of the procedure 
of Article 17. In this respect, an ESA has full control of the first stage 
of the procedure, as it has the power to initiate an investigation on its 
own initiative and also to issue a recommendation.239 In addition, in 
the second stage, the Commission’s opinion “Shall take into account 
the Authority’s recommendation”.240 Furthermore, in the third stage, 
an ESA is vested with binding powers to put an end to a breach of EU 
law through an individual decision.241 
Despite the prima facie extensive reach of the powers of the 
ESAs under Article 17, these are also subject to important limitations. 
In the first place, the scope of an ESA’s direct binding decision for 
breaches of EU law is restricted to instances in which lack of 
compliance of a CSA with the Commission’s formal opinion also 
results in and/or implies lack of compliance of a market participant 
with EU law 242 –which, as has been explained in relation to the 
mediation procedure in Section VI.A may not always be the case in 
instances of supervisory disagreement. Additionally, the power of an 
ESA to issue a direct binding decision under Article 17 is subject to 
strict conditionality–e.g. actual or potential distortion to competition 
or the functioning or integrity of the financial system, and direct 
applicability of the relevant EU law to the financial institution to 
which the binding decision is addressed.243 These conditions largely 
restrict the use of Article 17 in supervisory cooperation disputes 
between an ESA and a CSA. Furthermore, a decision of an ESA 
based on Article 17 may be challenged by a CSA before the Board of 
Appeal of the ESAs 244  and, ultimately, before the CJEU; 245 
consequently, this reduces the potential of an ESA’s prejudiced use of 
Article 17. The Commission Proposal on the Review of the ESAs also 
embraces a shift of decision-making power in relation to Article 17, 
from the ESAs’ Boards of Supervisors to the ESAs’ Executive 
                                                                                                             
239. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, arts. 17.2-3. 
240. Id. art. 17.4.  
241. Id. art. 17.6.  
242. Id. 
243. Id. 
244. ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, art. 60.  
245. Id. art. 61.  
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Boards, with a view to, among others, reducing the scope of national 
interferences in decisions pertaining to breaches of EU law.246 
VII. THE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE DUTY TO COOPERATE AND 
THE ABILITY TO COOPERATE: MULTI-LEVEL SUPERVISORY 
POWERS, LEGAL MANDATES, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
As has been explained throughout the previous Parts, the 
constitutional, legal and regulatory frameworks at both the European 
Union and Member State levels institute, in different degrees, 
cooperation duties between CSAs. Compliance with those 
cooperation duties requires an adequate empowerment of the 
supervisory authorities, which, for instance, enables them to fulfill a 
given request of cooperation from a counterpart. When and if a CSA 
does not have adequate powers to cooperate, the effective provision 
of cooperation may be hindered. The fragmented nature of the 
European supervisory framework, where supervisory powers are 
widespread among several CSAs operating at different levels, may 
trigger some tensions between cooperation duties, on the one side, 
and the ability of CSAs to provide cooperation, on the other. Such 
tensions owe to two primary reasons. 
First, CSAs across the European Union diverge substantially in 
their structures and powers. Over the years, each Member State has 
developed its own financial supervisory architecture based on local 
preferences, experiences, and needs. 247  This has resulted in a 
somewhat byzantine scheme that combines, not only various financial 
supervisory models–such as the three-pillar, the single supervisor248 
or the twin-peaks–, but also distinctive and, often, dissimilar domestic 
approaches to the CSAs’ supervisory powers. Moreover, Member 
States frequently shift from one model to another, notably, as a result 
of crises or scandals in the financial realm and to consequential 
concerns about the effectiveness of institutional financial supervisory 
                                                                                                             
246. See Commission Proposal on the Review of the ESAs, supra note 214, at 20, 22, 
23, 68. See also Impact Assessment on the Commission Proposal on the Review of the ESAs,  
supra note 214, at 46-7. 
247. See, e.g., ECB, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SUPERVISORY STRUCTURES IN THE EU 
MEMBER STATES (2007-10) 1 (2010). 
248. In this model, also known as the integrated approach, a single CSA is entrusted with 
both the prudential and conduct of business supervision of all financial sectors and entities in a 
given jurisdiction. Group of Thirty, supra note 22, at 13-14. 
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frameworks. 249  This has led to a complex and heterogeneous 
supervisory picture. Although the global financial crisis has brought 
about limited institutional convergence towards the twin-peaks 
model, 250  there still are major divergences in the structures and 
powers of CSAs across Member States. 251  Second, financial 
supervision involves carrying out actions subject to substantive and 
procedural requirements of various areas of the law, such as general 
administrative law and data protection rules, which also vary 
significantly across the Member States. 
The diversity of supervisory architectures and powers, as well as 
the differences in the general legal frameworks relevant to the 
provision of supervisory cooperation may create some practical 
problems; notably, when a CSA from a Member State requests the 
performance of a supervisory action to a CSA from another Member 
State, the latter may not be able to perform it owing to lack of powers, 
or because such provision of cooperation would result in a breach of 
its domestic laws. The Lamfalussy reports acknowledged the diversity 
of supervisory competences of CSAs across the European Union and 
the potential negative impact that such differences might have on 
supervisory cooperation; 252  they also highlighted the need for 
convergence of supervisory powers available to CSAs.253 These calls 
for greater convergence were reflected in various FSAP directives, 
such as the MiFID and the MAD, which introduced regimes 
concerning the minimum supervisory powers of CSAs. For example, 
Article 12 of the MAD and Article 50.2 of the MiFID both developed 
rather comprehensive ad minimis catalogues of powers that CSAs 
must have at their disposal for the exercise of supervisory functions, 
including, among others, the authority to access documents and 
data,254 to require or demand information from any person,255 and to 
                                                                                                             
249. See generally, Donato Masciandaro et al., Regulating the Regulators: The Changing 
Face of Financial Supervision Architectures Before and After the Crisis, 6 EUR. COMPANY L. 
187 (2009) (explaining why Member States change their financial regulatory schemes). 
250. PETER VAN CLEYNENBREUGEL, MARKET SUPERVISION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
INTEGRATED ADMINISTRATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 210 (2015). 
251. See ECB, supra note 247. 
252. See Initial Lamfalussy Report, supra note 80, at 34-35; Lamfalussy Report, supra 
note 80, at 21; see also Commission, Communication from the Commission: Review of the 
Lamfalussy Process – Strengthening Supervisory Convergence, COM (2007) 727 final, at 10. 
253. See Lamfalussy Report, supra note 80, at 38. 
254. MAD, supra note 167, art. 12.2(a); MiFID, supra note 168, art. 50.2(a).  
255. MAD, supra note 167, art. 12.2(b); MiFID, supra note 168, art. 50.2(b).  
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carry out on-site inspections.256 The specific scope of these minimum 
supervisory powers was nonetheless limited by Member States’ 
domestic laws.257 If a Member State’s domestic laws did not empower 
a CSA to directly exercise a given supervisory power included in the 
catalogue of minimum supervisory powers set by the relevant EU 
financial laws,258 the latter embraced the possibility of and required 
the co-exercise of such powers with other regulatory authorities, their 
delegation to regulatory authorities, or their exercise by application to 
judicial authorities. 259  In other words, according to the regulatory 
model encompassed by EU financial law, for each supervisory power 
listed among the minimum powers there ought to be an authority able 
to either exercise or co-exercise it in every Member State. Whereas 
this regulatory framework brought about increasing consistency to the 
EU financial supervisory system, it also had some flaws, notably, it 
encouraged a minimum harmonization of powers available at the 
Member State level for supervisory tasks rather than a convergence of 
CSAs’ supervisory powers across Member States. Under this system, 
tasks instrumental to financial supervision may be decentralized 
across various authorities, not necessarily limited to CSAs. These 
supervisory chains pose a risk of increasing the complexity of the 
supervisory architecture. 260  Likewise, they may make supervisory 
cooperation more complex because, under them, the accomplishment 
of a single supervisory action–such as the gathering of information 
from a market participant–may require coordinated action by or 
authorizations from different entities in one Member State. The risk 
of inefficient supervisory cooperation may be exacerbated when some 
authorities–such as the judiciary–in charge of some tasks within a 
supervisory chain lack independence or efficiency. 
                                                                                                             
256. MAD, supra note 167, art. 12.2(c); MiFID, supra note 168, art. 50.2(c).  
257. See, e.g., MAD, supra note 167, art. 12.2 (“the powers referred to in paragraph 1 of 
this Article shall be exercised in conformity with national law and shall include at least the 
right to . . .”). 
258. This could, for instance, be the case in which a CSA of a given Member State is not 
empowered to intervene telephone conversations or enter the premises of a firm only after 
receiving judicial authorization. On the differences between the powers of CSAs of the 
Member States in relation to market abuse supervision, see CESR, Review Panel Report: 
MAD Options and Discretions (CESR/09-1120), at 88-93. 
259. See, e.g., MAD, supra note 167, art. 12.1; MiFID, supra note 168, art. 50.1.  
260. See, e.g., Nicolas Véron, Is Europe Ready for a Major Banking Crisis?, 4 (Bruegel 
Policy Brief No. 2007/03, 2007). 
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The de Larosiére Report voiced concerns about the persistence 
of important differences in the powers of CSAs and recommended the 
adoption of measures aimed at enhancing the consistency of CSAs’ 
supervisory remits across the European Union. 261  In its 
Communication on Reinforcing Sanctioning Regimes in the Financial 
Services Sector,262 the Commission acknowledged that the differences 
among legal systems of the Member States was one of the reasons 
behind the divergences in the sanctioning powers of CSAs and 
undertook to make proposals targeted at furthering greater 
convergence in this area.263 Post-crisis EU legislation has attempted 
to foster convergence primarily by broadening and redefining the 
catalogue of powers of CSAs. For example, the MAR has added the 
power “to enter the premises of natural and legal persons in order to 
seize documents and data”264 to the list of minimum powers of CSAs, 
as this was a power lacked by some CSAs. 265 Despite these 
improvements in the consistency of the scope of the CSAs’ 
supervisory powers, the post-crisis EU financial laws are largely 
inspired by the regime of minimum harmonization of supervisory 
powers subject to national implementation, as developed by the FSAP 
directives.266 Consequently, they reflect one of the weaknesses of the 
pre-crisis regime, namely, the risk of supervisory powers being 
exercised through chains of actors. This may increase the complexity 
of –while also hindering the efficiency of–supervisory cooperation. 
                                                                                                             
261. De Larosiére Report, supra note 38, at 23, 39-42. 
262. Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
Reinforcing sanctioning regimes in the financial services sector, COM (2010) 716 final. 
263. Id. at 6. 
264. MAR, supra note 171, art. 23.2(e).  
265. See Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment 
Accompanying the Document Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Insider Dealing Market Manipulation (Market Abuse) and the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Criminal Sanctions for Insider 
Dealing and Market Manipulation, SEC (2011) 1217 final, at 25. 
266. See, e.g., MAR, supra note 171, art. 23.2 (“In order to fulfil their duties under this 
Regulation, competent authorities shall have, in accordance with national law, at least the 
following supervisory and investigatory powers”) (emphasis added); see also MiFID II, supra 
note 156, art. 72.1; MAR, supra note 171, art. 23.1; Directive 2013/36/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions 
and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 
2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, art. 64.2, 2013 O.J. L 
176/338 [hereinafter CRD IV]. 
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An aspect relating to the CSAs’ ability to cooperate with each 
other, to which the post-de Larosiére overhaul has given particular 
attention, is the CSAs’ mandates. The creation of the ESFS and the 
Banking Union, and the allocation of important tasks to CSAs within 
them, has led to the configuration of transnational mandates that 
obligate CSAs to accomplish goals beyond their own jurisdictions. 
For instance, in their role as members of the governing bodies of the 
ESAs, the SSM and the SRM, representatives of CSAs must act in the 
interest of the European Union as a whole.267 Some post-crisis EU 
laws also embrace general transnational mandates that CSAs must 
abide within their day-to-day supervision at the national level. For 
example, Article 7 of the Capital Requirements Directive IV (“CRD 
IV”) stipulates that: “the competent authorities in each Member State 
shall, in the exercise of their general duties, duly consider the 
potential impact of their decisions on the stability of the financial 
system in the other Member States concerned and, in particular, in 
emergency situations, based on the information available at the 
relevant time.” 
Despite the post-crisis broadening of the Member State CSAs’ 
mandates, the latter remain, to a primary extent, national and relate to 
the accomplishment of objectives pertaining to financial systems, 
markets, institutions and firms in the CSAs’ own jurisdictions. The 
laws instituting national CSAs often acknowledge, in an explicit 
manner, the national character of the CSAs’ mandates. For example, 
in the UK, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“FSMA 
2000”) defines the FCA’s integrity objective as: “protecting and 
enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system”.268 
There is some tension between the national character of the core 
mandates of Member State CSAs and the latter’s position within EU 
financial regulatory and supervisory structures–such as the ESFS and 
the SSM–oriented towards cross-border goals.269 When it comes to 
the specific area of cooperation, a potential problem is that a CSA 
from a Member State may be faced with a request of cooperation, 
                                                                                                             
267. See, e.g., ESAs Regulations, supra note 114, arts. 42, 46; SRM Regulation, supra 
note 135, art. 47.  
268. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8, Part 1A, Chapter 1, § 1D(1). 
269. On the potential conflicts between EU and national mandates for financial sector 
supervisors see Daniel C. Hardy, A European Mandate for Financial Sector Supervisors in the 
EU, 21-22 (IMF Working Paper No. 09/5, 2009). 
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whose compliance with would advance EU-wide objectives of 
financial supervision to the detriment of that Member State’s 
supervisory mandates. Although the principle of supremacy of EU 
law ordinarily requires a national mandate that conflicts with a duty 
of cooperation set by EU law to be set aside, 270  a CSA may be 
nonetheless incentivized to refuse cooperation or provide an 
incomplete cooperation to maximize its compliance with its domestic 
mandates. 
The accountability relationships within which CSAs operate are 
critical to understanding how CSAs balance the various mandates, 
duties, and interests at stake in a particular cooperation context. 
Although the post-crisis overhaul on EU financial services regulation 
and supervision incorporates some forms of multi-level transnational 
accountability–for example an ESA may hold a CSA to account 
through the binding mediation mechanism of Article 19 of the ESAs 
Regulations–, the account principals with the power to call and/or 
hold CSAs to account are largely domestic actors. For example, the 
power to appoint and dismiss the heads of CSAs lies with 
governments and/or parliaments in each Member State. Similarly, the 
creation, abolition and funding of CSAs depends on decisions made 
by political institutions in the jurisdictions of the CSAs concerned.271 
In addition, the accountability of CSAs at the national level is 
essentially determined by the extent to which they accomplish their 
mandates,272 which tend to have a marked national character. Owing 
to the predominantly domestic nature of both the mandates and 
accountability of the Member State CSAs, when these CSAs are faced 
with cooperation requests in which domestic interests are at stake, 
they may have an incentive to prioritize the maximization of such 
interests rather than the broader goals embraced by EU law 
cooperation duties or mandates.273 This may be particularly true when 
                                                                                                             
270. ALINA KACZOROWSKA, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 285 (4th ed. 2016). 
271. Donato Masciandaro, Maria J. Nieto & Marc Quintyn, Will They Sing the Same 
Tune? Measuring Convergence in the New European System of Financial Supervisors, in 
HANDBOOK OF CENTRAL BANKING, FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: AFTER THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 509-11 (Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro eds., 2011). 
272. Iglesias-Rodríguez, supra note 1, at 15. On the importance of clear mandates for 
ensuring accountability see Eva Hüpkes et al ., Accountability Arrangements for Financial 
Sector Regulators, 3 (IMF Economic Issues No. 39, 2006). 
273. In the early stages of the global financial crisis, CSAs’ actions driven by the 
protection of national interests sometimes had distortive effects on international capital flows. 
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CSAs are not properly insulated from undue political pressure and 
stakeholder interferences in their respective Member States. 
VIII. THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL CRISIS, BREXIT, AND THE 
FUTURE OF SUPERVISORY COOPERATION IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
From the outset, the EU single market for financial services has 
developed through a process of incremental integration. The Single 
European Act, the FSAP, the Lamfalussy and de Larosiére 
architectures, the Banking Union, and the Capital Markets Union274 
represent steps of such a process, which has led to increasing degrees 
of regulatory and supervisory convergence as well as greater 
centralization of decision-making at the EU level. 275  The various 
crises that the European Union has been facing since the year 2008 
do, nevertheless, raise some concerns about the future, scope, and 
pace of the process of EU financial services integration. 
On the one side, the financial, euro, and sovereign debt crises, 
and their effects on the EU economy, have reduced the trust of 
citizens in the European Union276 and led to a decline of support of 
the process of EU integration. 277 Likewise, disagreements between 
                                                                                                             
An example was asset ring-fencing in the UK and Germany in response to the Icelandic 
Banks’ crisis and Lehman’s default, respectively. See Stijn Claessens, The Financial Crisis 
and Financial Nationalism, in EFFECTIVE CRISIS RESPONSE AND OPENNESS: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE TRADING SYSTEM 269-70 (Simon J. Evenett et al. eds., 2009).  
274. The Capital Markets Union is a plan that was adopted by the Commission in 
September 2015. Its main goal is to create a single EU capital market by 2019. The focus of 
the Capital Markets Union Plan is on, inter alia, the promotion of mechanisms of direct 
finance and cross-border capital flows –see Commission, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets 
Union, COM (2015) 468 final. 
275. See, e.g., Jennifer Payne & Elizabeth Howell, The Creation of a European Capital 
Market, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF THE EU’S INTERNAL MARKET (Panos 
Koutrakos & Jukka Snell eds., 2017); Commission, Feedback Statement on the Public 
Consultation on the Operations of the European Supervisory Authorities Having Taken Place 
from 21 March to 16 May 2017 (June 20, 2017), at 5, https://ec.europa.eu/info/
sites/info/files/2017-esas-operations-summary-of-responses_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8VQ-
LBSR] (archived Mar. 8, 2018). 
276 . See, e.g., Chase Foster & Jeffry Frieden, Crisis of Trust: Socio-Economic 
Determinants of Europeans’ Confidence in Government, 18 EUR. UNION POLITICS 511, 
512 (2017). 
277. See, e.g., Vivien A. Schmidt, The Eurozone’s Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy: Can 
the EU Rebuild Public Trust and Support for European Economic Integration?, 7 (Directorate-
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Member States regarding responses to these crises–for example, 
Germany supports austerity and structural reforms while Greece 
opposes them–have led to greater polarization and tensions. 278  In 
addition, the post-crisis trend of centralization of financial regulatory, 
supervisory, and, more generally, executive powers at the EU level279 
has not been equally welcomed by all Member States.280 On the other 
side, the EU’s legitimacy and political crises have been magnified by 
Member States’ diverging approaches to core areas of EU policy, 
such as migration and security, which have accentuated internal 
frictions within the European Union.281 
                                                                                                             
General for Economic and Financial Affairs European Economy Discussion Paper No. 15, 
2015).  
278. See, e.g., Klaus Armingeon & Skyler Cranmer, Position-Taking in the Euro Crisis, 
24 J. OF EUR. PUB. POLICY 1, 2 (2017); Alastair Macdonald & Jan Strupczewski, Who Rules? 
Euro Zone Budget Tensions Surface, REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-eurozone-budgets-supervisor/who-rules-euro-zone-budget-tensions-surface-
idUSKBN13C22R [https://perma.cc/MR6C-QJJF] (archived Mar. 8, 2018). 
279. For examples of this kind of centralization, see Stefano Micossi, How the EZ Crisis 
is Permanently Changing EU Institutions (Centre for Economic Policy Research Policy Insight 
No. 65, 2013). 
280. For example, the United Kingdom has long been a strong opponent of shifting 
decision-making power from national bodies to EU bodies, such as the shift made by the ESFS 
–see, e.g., Lucia Quaglia, The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Politics of Financial Services Regulation in the 
European Union, 17 NEW POL. ECON. 515, 525 (2012); see also United Kingdom v. European 
Parliament & European Council, Case C-270/12 [2014] ECR I-0, ¶ 101, http://curia.europa.eu
/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30dc90808aa4aa2d419ba46b9df567a1b8d7.
e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxyNaxr0?text=&docid=140965&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mod
e=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1322385 [https://perma.cc/7FED-ZYCY] (archived Mar. 
8, 2018) (rejecting the UK’s challenge to the constitutionality of the powers of ESMA in 
respect of short-selling bans); United Kingdom v. European Central Bank [ECB], Case T-
496/11, 2015, ¶ 110, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid
=162667&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1323584 
[https://perma.cc/VLQ5-EAPM] (archived Mar. 8, 2018) (accepting the UK’s argument that 
the ECB lacked the power to impose requirements regarding the location of Central 
Counterparty Clearing Houses (“CCPs”)). Likewise, the German Federal Financial 
Supervision Authority (“BaFin”) also voiced concerns over the centralization of supervisory 
powers in the SSM –see Domenico Lombardi & Manuela Moschella, Domestic Preferences 
and European Banking Supervision: Germany, Italy and the Single Supervisory Mechanism, 
39 W. EUR. POL. 462, 473 (2016). 
281. See generally, Gabriela Baczynska, No Compromise in Sight, EU Ministers at Odds 
over Immigration, REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-
migrants-eu/no-compromise-in-sight-eu-ministers-at-odds-over-immigration-idUSKBN13D1A
F [https://perma.cc/G35S-5YMR] (archived Mar. 8, 2018); Francois Murphy & Isla Binnie, 
Austria Says to Control Migrants on Italy Border, Rome Protests, REUTERS (July 4, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-austria-italy/austria-says-to-control-
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One of the manifestations of the EU’s various crises has been the 
rise of in popularity of political parties that oppose EU integration, 
notably in France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany.282 Another 
more dramatic outcome was the decision by the United Kingdom to 
leave the European Union. 283  In addition, at the EU level, the 
Commission and the Council have been mulling over a multi-speed 
European Union with different degrees and speeds of integration 
across Member States.284 
A. The EU-UK Supervisory Relationship after Brexit 
Brexit raises important questions about the future of financial 
integration and supervisory cooperation in Europe. The United 
Kingdom is one of the main international financial centers and it hosts 
some of the largest financial entities from the EU internal market.285  
The PRA and the FCA–as well as their predecessors–have played a 
central role in shaping EU financial services regulation and 
supervision.286 Brexit will transform the nature of the relationships 
between the CSAs in the European Union and those in the United 
Kingdom. The position of the United Kingdom in this new framework 
will largely depend on whether the negotiations between the 
European Union and the United Kingdom result in a “soft” or a 
“hard” Brexit. 
                                                                                                             
migrants-on-italy-border-rome-protests-idUSKBN19P1B5 [https://perma.cc/NGT3-CAMU] 
(archived Mar. 8, 2018). 
282. See Benjamin Dodman, France, Germany and the Netherlands: The Elections that 
Could Derail the EU in 2017, FRANCE 24 (Dec. 31, 2016), http://www.france24.com/en/
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[https://perma.cc/N5DU-3HR5] (archived Mar. 8, 2018).  
283. The majority of the votes in the EU referendum on June 23, 2016 supported Brexit. 
For an analysis of the results of the EU referendum, see Elise Uberoi, European Union 
Referendum 2016 (House of Commons Briefing Paper CBP 7639, 2016). 
284. See infra, Section VIII.B.  
285. See, e.g., CITY OF LONDON CORPORATION, LONDON: EUROPE AND THE WORLD’S 
FINANCIAL CENTRE (2014); Simeon Djankov, The City of London after Brexit, 5-10 (London 
School of Economics, Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper No. 762, 2017). 
286. See generally, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, SHAPING LEGISLATION: UK 
ENGAGEMENT IN EU FINANCIAL SERVICES POLICY-MAKING (2016) (summarizing case 
studies of the influence of the United Kingdom on five recent EU financial services laws). 
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In a soft Brexit scenario, the United Kingdom would keep its 
membership in the European Economic Association (“EEA”)287 and, 
consequently, companies established in the United Kingdom would 
be able to maintain access to the single market for financial services 
in the European Union through the single passport. 288  Under this 
framework, the United Kingdom would be subject to EU financial 
markets legislation289 and, therefore, to the corresponding cooperation 
duties vis-à-vis other CSAs and the ESAs. With respect to the 
position of the United Kingdom within the ESFS, the representatives 
of the PRA and the FCA would become non-voting members of the 
Boards of Supervisors of the ESAs.290 When it comes to supervisory 
cooperation disputes, CSAs in the United Kingdom would be subject 
to the mediation mechanism of Article 19 of the ESAs Regulations; 
however, only the European Free Trade Association (“EFTA”) 
Surveillance Authority, not the ESAs, would have the authority to 
                                                                                                             
287. Eilis Ferran, The UK as a Third Country Actor in EU Financial Services 
Regulation, 2 (University of Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper No. 47/2016, 2016).  
288. Under the single passport rights, financial entities authorized in a European 
Economic Association (“EEA”) Member State have the right to provide services in other EEA 
Member States without additional authorizations. See European Parliament, Briefing on 
Understanding Equivalence and the Single Passport in Financial Services: Third-Country 
Access to the Single Market (PE 599.267, 2017), at 3, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData
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289. The EEA Agreement extends the Single Market freedoms to EEA-European Free 
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subjecting these countries to the EU internal market laws. See European Parliament, Briefing 
Note: Overview of EU Rules Applicable to EEA/EFTA Countries in Financial Services, 
Competition and Taxation (PE 408.579, 2008), at 2. 
290. The ESAs Regulations were incorporated into the EEA Agreement by: Decision of 
the EEA Joint Committee No. 199/2016 of 30 September 2016 Amending Annex IX 
(Financial Services) to the EEA Agreement [2017/276], 2016 O.J. L 46/4 (incorporating the 
EBA Regulation); Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No. 200/2016 of 30 September 2016 
Amending Annex IX (Financial Services) to the EEA Agreement [2017/277], 2016 O.J. L 
46/13 (incorporating the EIOPA Regulation); and Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No. 
201/2016 of 30 September 2016 Amending Annex IX (Financial Services) to the EEA 
Agreement [2017/278], 2016 O.J. L 46/22 (incorporating the ESMA Regulation). The heads of 
the relevant CSAs of EEA-EFTA Member States are non-voting members of the Boards of 
Supervisors of the ESAs–see, e.g., EEA Consolidated Version of Regulation (EU) No. 
1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 Establishing a 
European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), Amending Decision No. 
716/2009/EC and Repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (2010 O.J. L 331/12) as 
Adapted for the Purposes of the EEA Agreement by Decision of the EEA Joint Committee No. 
199/2016 of 30 September 2016 (2017 O.J. L 46/4), art. 40.1(b) [hereinafter EEA 
Consolidated Regulation No. 1093/2010]. 
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issue a binding mediation decision against these CSAs. 291  The 
likelihood of the UK’s membership in the EEA post-Brexit is, in 
principle, low 292  because membership would imply a series of 
commitments, such as acceptance of the EU’s four freedoms and 
indirect judicial oversight by the CJEU,293 which clash with the UK 
Conservative Party’s manifesto.294 
Regarding the possibility of UK financial entities relocating to 
the European Union to maintain access to the single market for 
financial services, an opinion issued by ESMA in May 2017 295 
suggests that authorizations issued to relocating entities will be 
subject to strict conditionality296 and CSAs of the Member States will 
be expected to monitor the real reasons these entities move to the 
European Union and to “reject any relocation request creating letter-
box entities where, for instance, extensive use of outsourcing and 
delegation is foreseen with the intention of benefitting from an EU 
passport, while essentially performing all substantial activities or 
functions outside the EU27.”297 
In a hard Brexit scenario,298 namely one in which the United 
Kingdom does not maintain membership in the EEA and there is no 
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295. ESMA, General Principles to Support Supervisory Convergence in the Context of 
the United Kingdom Withdrawing from the European Union (ESMA42-110-433) (May 31, 
2017). 
296. In areas relating to, among others, the governance, operations, and outsourcing and 
delegation agreements of the relocating financial entities. Id. at 3-6. 
297. Id. at 5. 
298. Various commentators see hard Brexit as a highly likely scenario –see, e.g., John 
Springford, Why a Hard Brexit Looks Likely, 110 CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN REFORM BULLETIN 
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alternative agreement giving it similar rights,299 the United Kingdom 
would become a third-country for regulatory and supervisory 
purposes.300 In such a scenario, the UK’s access to the single market 
for financial services would depend on the issuance of an equivalence 
decision by the Commission301 finding the financial regulatory and 
supervisory regime in the United Kingdom to be equivalent to that in 
the European Union. 302  The access rights granted under the 
equivalence framework are, however, much more restricted than those 
available through the single passport.303 For instance, equivalence can 
only be requested by third-countries and granted by the Commission 
when an EU financial law allows for such possibility, and only for the 
specific purposes stipulated in such law. Moreover, a decision on 
equivalence can be unilaterally withdrawn by the Commission. 304 
Regarding financial supervision, the UK CSAs would no longer be 
subject to supervisory cooperation duties required under EU law; nor 
would they form part of the ESFS and its supervisory cooperation 
instruments. More generally, Brexit, particularly its “hard” version, 
will cause greater divergence between the EU law and UK law,305 
which may have a potential impact on the ability of CSAs from both 
sides of the Channel to cooperate with each other. 
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Brexit Banks Compromise, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/
professional/blog/goodbye-passport-hello-equivalence-brexit-banks-compromise/ [https://
perma.cc/VG22-JP73] (archived Mar, 8, 2018). 
304.  European Parliament, Third-Country Equivalence in EU Banking Legislation (PE 
587.369, 2017), at 2. 
305. See, e.g., WILLIAM WRIGHT, THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF BREXIT ON EUROPEAN 
CAPITAL MARKETS: A QUALITATIVE SURVEY OF MARKET PARTICIPANTS 15 (2016). 
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In areas of systemic importance for the financial system, Brexit 
may require the European Union to redefine its relationship with the 
United Kingdom in order to address potential threats to the stability of 
the EU financial system. One area of regulation that will likely need 
this redefining is post-trading. 306  In June 2017, the Commission 
proposed a new regulatory framework 307  for third-country Central 
Counterparty Clearing Houses (“CCPs”) 308  aimed at strengthening 
their supervision to mitigate systemic risks in the European Union.309 
Due to the central role that CCPs play in the functioning of financial 
systems, their failure could have a systemic impact.310 Recognized 
third-country CCPs clear a significant amount of financial instruments 
denominated in Euro and other currencies of the Member States.311 
As a result, disruptions affecting recognized third-country CCPs may 
have a major effect in the stability of the EU financial system.312 In 
the Commission’s view, the supervisory cooperation arrangements 
embraced by the equivalence regime did not properly guarantee 
robust supervision of recognized non-EU CCPs:  
after a third-country CCP has been recognized [sic], ESMA has 
encountered difficulties in accessing information from the CCP, 
                                                                                                             
306 . Post-trading primarily refers to two functions: clearing and settlement. For an 
overview of post-trading see GIOVANNINI GROUP, CROSS-BORDER CLEARING AND 
SETTLEMENT ARRANGEMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 4-6 (2001). 
307. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Securities and Markets Authority) and amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 as regards the 
procedures and authorities involved for the authorisation of CCPs and requirements for the 
recognition of third-country CCPs, COM (2017) 331 final [hereinafter Commission’s 
Proposal]. 
308. One of the main functions performed by CCPs is novation. Novation refers to the 
substitution of a contract between a buyer and a seller of securities for two new contracts, one 
between the buyer and the CCP and another between the seller and the CCP.  By interposing 
itself between the buyer and the seller and guaranteeing the performance of the obligations of 
the parties in case of default by any of them, the CCP mitigates counterparty risk. On the role 
of CCPs in risk mitigation see Douglas D. Evanoff et al., Policymakers, Researchers, and 
Practitioners Discuss the Role of Central Counterparties, 30 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO 2, 3-4 (2006); Kirsi Ripatti, Central Counterparty 
Clearing: Constructing a Framework for Evaluation of Risks and Benefits (Bank of Finland 
Discussion Paper No. 30/2004, 2004). 
309. Commission Press Release, IP/17/1568 (June 13, 2017). 
310. Amandeep Rehlon & Dan Nixon, Central Counterparties: What Are They, Why Do 
They Matter and How Does the Bank Supervise Them?, 53 BANK ENG. Q. BULL. 147, 147 
(2013); Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 4. 
311. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 5. 
312. Id. at 5-6. 
658 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:589 
in conducting on-site inspections of the CCP and in sharing 
information with the relevant EU regulators, supervisors and 
central banks. As a result, there is a risk that third country CCP 
practices and/or adjustments to risk management models go 
undetected and/or unaddressed, which may have important 
financial-stability implications for the EU entities.313 
The Commission’s Proposal specifically acknowledges the risks 
posed by Brexit. The United Kingdom hosts some of the main CCPs 
clearing euro-denominated transactions, such as London Clearing 
House Limited (“LCH”).314 Consequently, the UK’s withdrawal from 
the European Union, would lead to a major increase in the volume of 
transactions being cleared in third-countries and subjected to lesser 
degrees of EU oversight.315 
Under the proposed reform, ESMA would be tasked with 
carrying out assessments on the systemic importance of third-country 
CCPs for the financial stability of the European Union. 316  These 
assessments may determine, either that a CCP is or likely to become 
systemically important (“Tier-2 CCPs”),317 or that a CCP is neither 
systemically important nor likely to become so (“Tier-1 CCPs”).318 
Tier-1 CCPs would be subject to the general equivalence and 
recognition regime.319 Tier-2 CCPs would be further divided in two 
categories, which would each receive different regulatory treatment. 
On the one hand, ESMA may consider a Tier-2 CCP to be 
systemically important; such CCP would be under a special 
regulatory regime where, in addition to compliance with the general 
equivalence conditions, it must fulfill additional requirements, such as 
the EMIR prudential rules applicable to CCPs in the European 
Union.320 On the other hand, ESMA may conclude that a CCP is of 
substantial systemic importance;321 this would apply to CCPs that, 
because of their particular features (e.g. their concentration of 
                                                                                                             
313. Id. at 5. 
314. See Philip Stafford & Rachel Toplensky, EU Outlines 3 Options for London’s Euro 
Clearing Business, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 4, 2017). 
315. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 6. 
316. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 24, recital 29. 
317. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 24; and proposed art. 25.2a of EMIR. 
318. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 24; and proposed art. 25.2(e) of EMIR. 
319. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 24. 
320. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 24-25; and proposed art. 25.2b(a) of 
EMIR. 
321. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 25; and proposed art. 25.2c of EMIR. 
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clearing operations) pose major risks to the stability of the European 
Union or to one or more Member States; 322  the Commission’s 
Proposal deems the regulatory and supervisory arrangements 
embraced by the third-country equivalence-recognition regime to be 
unsuitable for this type of CCPs and that, therefore, they should not 
have access to it;323 ESMA may propose to the Commission that a 
CCP deemed to be of substantial systemic importance is not 
recognized; if the Commission adopts an implementing act to that 
effect, then the recognition regime would be dis-applied, with the 
result that the third-country Tier-2 CCP concerned could only provide 
services within the EU single market by relocating to the European 
Union.324 The criteria that ESMA will use to determine the systemic 
importance of CCPs include their size, the value of the transactions 
cleared in each EU currency, and the impact that their failure would 
have on the EU financial system. 325  Consequently, the proposed 
regime might result in some UK-based CCPs that play a central role 
in the clearing of euro-denominated transactions, such as LCH, being 
forced to move their clearing business to the European Union or else 
lose their access to the EU single market.326 
Overall, the proposed reform would result in greater 
centralization of supervisory functions pertaining to third-country 
CCPs at the EU level. Notably, ESMA would be entrusted with the 
supervision of both Tier-1 and Tier-2 CCPs, particularly with respect 
to ongoing compliance with the conditions for recognition. 327  In 
addition, some of the EMIR’s proposed amendments are aimed at 
fostering supervisory cooperation by, for example, requiring that “the 
cooperation arrangements between ESMA and the relevant competent 
authorities of equivalent CCP third-country regimes . . . be effective 
in practice.” 328  The Commission’s Proposal also stipulates that 
equivalence and recognition will be conditional on the effective 
                                                                                                             
322. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 25-26. 
323. Id.; and proposed art. 25.2c of EMIR. 
324. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 26; and proposed art. 25.2c of EMIR. 
325. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 24; and proposed art. 25.2a of EMIR. 
326 . Huw Jones, LCH Urges EU to Avoid Forced Relocation of Euro Clearing, 
REUTERS (June 7, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-clearing/lch-urges-eu-
to-avoid-forced-relocation-of-euro-clearing-idUKKBN18Y1FR [https://perma.cc/SQ3Z-3RZ9] 
(archived Mar. 8, 2018). 
327. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 26; and proposed art. 25.b of EMIR. 
328. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, at 26; and proposed art. 25.7 of EMIR. 
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cooperation by third-country CSAs. If these CSAs fail to cooperate in 
good faith with ESMA or other EU supervisors, the Commission can 
decide to revoke an equivalence decision. 329  The Commission’s 
Proposal has been complemented by the ECB’s Governing Council 
Recommendation of 22 June 2017 to Amend Article 22 of the Statute 
of the European System of Central Banks and of the European 
Central Bank. 330 Under this proposed reform, CCPs would be put 
under the ECB’s regulatory and supervisory remit. 331  The ECB’s 
proposal largely builds on the CJEU’s decision in Case T-496/11 
regarding the UK’s challenge to the power of the ECB to regulate 
CCPs and, notably, to its competence to impose location requirements 
under the Eurosystem Oversight Policy Framework. 332  The CJEU 
upheld the UK’s view but, at the same time, acknowledged that the 
ECB could request the EU legislature to grant the ECB the power to 
regulate CCPs if the ECB deemed such power necessary to the proper 
performance of its tasks.333 The proposed amendment to Article 22 of 
the Statute of the European System of Central Banks would result in 
additional centralization of CCP clearing regulation and supervision 
at the EU level, with the ECB playing a central role in the oversight, 
not only of EU CCPs, but also of third-country CCPs that clear euro-
denominated transactions.334 The ECB has indicated that it will take a 
strict approach to the recognition of third-country CCPs in order to 
preserve financial stability in the European Union.335 Consequently, 
the formulation of this proposal in the midst of the Brexit talks has 
                                                                                                             
329. Commission’s Proposal, supra note 307, recital 26. 
330. Recommendation for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Article 22 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the 
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331. The amended version of Article 22 of the Statute of the European System of Central 
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payment systems, and clearing systems for financial instruments, within the Union and with 
other countries.” Id. art. 1.  
332. ECB, EUROSYSTEM OVERSIGHT POLICY FRAMEWORK (2011). 
333. United Kingdom v. European Central Bank [ECB], Case T-496/11, 2015, ¶ 109, 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=162667&pageIndex=0&docl
ang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1323584 [https://perma.cc/Y5X8-NBX6] 
(archived Mar. 8, 2018).  
334. See ECB, supra note 330, recital 7. 
335. See Benoît Cœuré, European CCPs after Brexit:. Speech at the Global Financial 
Markets Association (June 20, 2017). 
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raised concerns among UK’s policy-makers and financial industry 
actors, who foresee a potential threat to a key sector of the UK’s 
financial industry.336 
In the post-Brexit scenario, the incentives of CSAs from the 
European Union and the United Kingdom to cooperate with each 
other will largely be determined by the degrees of financial 
interdependence between the European Union and the United 
Kingdom. A first potential scenario is one where the United Kingdom 
would lose relevance as a European financial center. This may 
happen, for instance, if there is an increase in financial outflows from 
the United Kingdom to the European Union in combination with a 
decrease in financial inflows from the European Union to the United 
Kingdom.337 In such a case, the scope of cooperation between the 
European Union and the United Kingdom would be more limited. A 
second potential scenario is one where the United Kingdom retains its 
relevance as a European financial center and the high degrees of 
financial interdependence between the European Union and the 
United Kingdom are maintained.338 In such a second scenario, CSAs 
would have incentives to develop arrangements that guarantee an 
efficient supervisory cooperation, even in absence of a strong 
framework of binding cooperation duties. 
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B. The Prospect of a Multi-Speed European Union and its Impact on 
Supervisory Cooperation 
The EU political crisis, which was to a certain degree 
exacerbated by the Brexit vote,339 received mixed policy reactions. 
Whereas some proposals point in the direction of greater integration 
and centralization of financial supervision at the EU level, others 
might lead to the coexistence of mixed degrees of integration within 
the single market for financial services. 
On the one side, the EU economic and political crises have 
increased awareness within the EU-27 about the need to advance the 
process of capital markets integration to support the EU economy.340 
The Mid-Term Review of the Capital Markets Union Action Plan, 
published by the Commission on June 8, 2017, acknowledges the 
instrumental role that supervision plays in the proper functioning of 
capital markets and suggests the need to move towards greater 
integration of the EU financial supervisory framework. 341  The 
reforms put forward by the Mid-Term Review include a future 
revision of the powers of the ESAs and, particularly, of ESMA aimed 
at fostering their role in EU financial supervision and broadening the 
areas of the financial system within their direct supervisory control.342 
These reforms, which would lead to more centralization of financial 
supervision in the European Union, build on the plan for a Financial 
Union343 proposed by the Five President’s Report published in June 
2015.344 The pillars of the Financial Union project are the Banking 
Union and the Capital Markets Union.345 The Five President’s Report 
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envisaged the future creation of a Single European Capital Markets 
Supervisor for the Capital Markets Union.346 
On the other side, the idea of a multi-speed Europe, which has 
been gaining force since the Rome Summit of March 2017,347 raises 
some questions about the future of financial integration and 
supervisory cooperation in the European Union. In the White Paper 
on the Future of Europe, published on March 1, 2017, 348  the 
Commission presented five potential scenarios regarding the future of 
the European Union. These scenarios, which ranged from “less EU” 
to “more EU,”349 reflected different political views about the process 
of EU integration. One of the pathways suggested by the Commission 
was “the European Union allows willing Member States to do more 
together in specific areas.” 350  This idea, which received mixed 
degrees of support from Member States, 351  was embraced by the 
leaders of the EU-27, the Council, the Parliament, and the 
Commission in the Rome Declaration of March 25, 2017.352 There is 
some uncertainty regarding whether and to what extent the single 
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European Union Press Release, 149/17 (Mar. 25, 2017). 
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market for financial services would be included within the scope of a 
multi-speed European Union. The White Paper on the Future of 
Europe does not include the financial sector among the areas that 
would operate under multi-tier arrangements.353 In addition, after the 
Rome Summit, EU policy-makers have made a series of decisions, 
such as the above-referred proposals to strengthen ESMA’s powers in 
the field of post-trading, that encompass an underlying notion of 
single-speed European Union and of advancing, en bloc, in the 
process of integration of the financial supervisory framework. 
There are policy arguments justifying a same-speed approach to 
financial regulation and supervision. Notably, the creation of different 
speeds or tiers of financial integration in the European Union could 
hinder the process of development and consolidation of the single 
market for financial services. The coexistence of various levels of 
supervisory integration with asymmetries in the extent and scope of 
cooperation duties depending on the Member States concerned could 
result in distortions in the quality and consistency of EU financial 
supervision. Indeed, a multi-speed internal market for financial 
services would be contrary to the objective of “ensuring common 
implementation of the rules for the financial sector and more 
centralized [sic] supervisory enforcement”354 and, more generally, to 
the process of construction of a Financial Union. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The post-financial crisis regulatory overhaul has dramatically 
transformed supervisory relationships in the European Union. The 
new system is based on a greater centralization of powers at the EU 
level, with EU bodies and institutions, such as the ESAs and the ECB, 
playing a key role in both the exercise and coordination of financial 
supervision. Nonetheless, the EU financial supervision architecture 
remains largely decentralized and the CSAs of the Member States, 
each with their own, and often dissimilar, structures, mandates and 
powers, carry out important day-to-day supervision of their own 
financial markets, actors, and institutions. One of the challenges 
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brought about by this new complex, multi-level architecture is how to 
articulate an efficient coordination, interaction, and cooperation 
between the actors entrusted with supervisory responsibilities at its 
various levels. The response of EU law has been threefold. 
In the first place, there has been a process of increasing 
harmonization of the rules on supervisory cooperation. EU Directives 
and Regulations in the financial field have developed a rather 
comprehensive catalogue of cooperation duties, reducing the 
discretion of Member States in the interpretation of the nature and 
scope of supervisory cooperation obligations. 
Second, the mechanisms for solving supervisory cooperation 
disputes among CSAs have been improved and strengthened. 
Notably, the allocation of binding mediation powers to the ESAs vis-
à-vis CSAs, albeit subject to important limitations, constitutes an 
important change of paradigm compared to the soft-law nature of the 
Lamfalussy Committees’ mediation decisions. The threat of 
deployment of those powers may create incentives for CSAs to 
comply with their cooperation duties, so as to avoid the potential costs 
of an ESA’s binding intervention in a supervisory cooperation 
dispute. 
Third, post-crisis EU laws have broadened the catalogue of 
minimum supervisory powers at the disposal of CSAs of the Member 
States, hence increasing their ability to fulfill requests of cooperation 
from fellow CSAs. Likewise, the ESFS and the Banking Union have 
embraced a transnationalization of supervisory mandates whereby 
Member State CSAs are bound to the accomplishment, not only of 
national objectives, but also of EU-wide supervisory targets. 
Despite the advancement of EU financial services integration 
and supervisory convergence brought by the post-crisis regulatory 
overhaul, the ESFS, and the Banking Union, this Article has 
identified and analyzed important obstacles for an efficient 
supervisory cooperation in the European Union. 
First, EU financial laws still encompass exceptions to the duty to 
cooperate that may be subject to biased interpretations and 
opportunistic uses by CSAs in order to refuse cooperation in 
particular instances. More generally, the analysis has shown that the 
content and scope of supervisory cooperation duties as defined by EU 
law often lack clarity and precision. This carries the risk of diverging 
interpretations by CSAs across the European Union and, 
consequently, of supervisory dissent. 
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Second, within the ESFS, the use of instruments for the 
settlement of disagreements between CSAs is subject to strict 
conditions that considerably limit their applicability in cases of 
supervisory cooperation disputes. Moreover, the activation of the 
ESAs’ mediation mechanism may create tensions and hinder trust 
between CSAs and, consequently, affect their future cooperation. 
Regarding disputes between an ESA and a CSA, the ESFS implicitly 
vests resolution power in the ESAs, hence giving rise to potential 
conflicts of interest. 
Third, notwithstanding the increasing degrees of harmonization 
of supervisory powers across the European Union, there still are 
important differences in the competences of CSAs in various Member 
States. This may, in turn, affect their ability to fulfill cooperation 
requests. Likewise, whereas the ESFS and the Banking Union have 
instituted transnational supervisory mandates, CSAs from the 
Member States operate under accountability structures that are 
primarily domestic. This may incentivize CSAs to pursue the 
prioritization of national interests in detriment of the accomplishment 
of EU-wide targets. 
Finally, the EU political crisis, Brexit –which may result in the 
United Kingdom becoming a third-country for supervisory purposes–
and the prospects of a multi-speed European Union with various 
degrees of integration, raise some concerns about the future of the 
process of EU financial integration and supervisory cooperation 
within the single market for financial services. 
In spite of these various crisis fronts, and of the limitations of 
the current EU legal and regulatory frameworks in dealing with the 
complexity of the financial supervision architecture, capital 
markets is an area where the process of integration has been 
advancing steadily. Brexit has indeed reinforced the determination 
of EU policy-makers to furthering such process; as put by 
Commissioner Dombrovskis: “As we face the departure of the 
largest EU financial centre, we are committed to stepping up our 
efforts to further strengthen and integrate the EU capital 
markets.” 355  Moreover, the EU institutions consider the 
enhancement of supervisory cooperation and convergence within 
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the European Union to be a key priority in the process of future 
financial reforms. For example, one of the main elements of the 
Commission’s public consultation on the operations of the ESAs 
related to the effectiveness of their tools and powers in fostering 
supervisory convergence and cooperation across borders.356 Also, 
the Mid-Term Review of the Capital Markets Union Action Plan 
has highlighted the need to strengthen the powers of ESMA to 
guarantee the consistency of financial supervision across the 
European Union. 357  On September 20, 2017 the Commission 
published a Proposal for a Regulation358 that is largely aimed at 
achieving more integrated supervision in the European Union; the 
Proposal’s reforms include an strengthening of the powers of the 
ESAs, a new governance structure for the ESAs less dependent on 
Member States’ interests, as well as greater centralization of 
financial supervision at the EU level.359 
Overall, these reforms may contribute to enhance the quality 
and efficiency of supervisory cooperation in the European Union; 
on the one side, by removing legal and regulatory barriers to 
cooperation, they may increase the ability of CSAs to cooperate 
with each other; on the other side, by supporting greater financial 
integration, these reforms may help to align the interests of CSAs 
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